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INTRODUCTION

Man hopes. Genius creates. To create,-to create, - is the proof of
a divine presence.
Whoever creates is God.
-Ralph

Waldo Emerson1

[Jiustice depends on a creative judiciary. But the compulsion to
make appearances deny the fact of judicial innovation and
individualization means that the most important task of the judge
must be done in a sneaking, hole-in-corner manner. The judicial
genius must do his work on the sly ....
-Jerome Frank2
To create, Jerome Frank pronounced in Law and the Modern
Mind, was emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary. Setting
himself in opposition to the nineteenth-century legal tradition, Frank
exposed the discretionary, unpredictable nature of the judicial
process. He derided previous generations for their idealizing
tendencies, which had led them to posit the existence of a
superhuman, passionless judge-one who mechanically applied a
stationary and certain set of legal rules to the cases brought before
him. This vision of adjudication was nothing more than an illusion,
Frank maintained, and persisting belief in it was explicable in
psychological terms.3 All grown men harbor a desire to "recapture,
through a rediscovery of a father, a childish, completely controllable
universe. '4 That desire manifested itself in the "partial, unconscious,
anthropomorphizing of Law, in ascribing to the Law some of the
characteristics of the child's Father-Judge."5 The first step towards
maturity, Frank advised fellow members of his profession, was
recognition of the fictive nature of legal rules and principles: "We
must stop telling stork-fibs about how law is born and cease even
hinting that perhaps there is still some truth in Peter Pan legends of a

1. 1 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The American Scholar: An Oration Delivered Before the
Phi Beta Kappa Society at Cambridge (Aug. 31, 1837), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH
WALDO EMERSON 49, 57 (Robert E. Spiller & Alfred R. Ferguson eds., 1971); 4 RALPH
WALDO EMERSON, Journal (July 17, 1837), in JOURNALS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON, 18361838, at 252, 253 (Edward Waldo Emerson & Waldo Emerson Forbes eds., 1910).
2. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 152 (Anchor Books 1970) (1930).

3. See id. at 19.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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juristic happy hunting ground in a land of legal absolutes." 6 American

law had come of age, he concluded, and it was high time for members
of the bench and bar to face the fact of judicial creativity.

Frank's message has not gone unheeded. Contemporary legal
scholars see the advent of Legal Realism as the end of an age of

innocence in American legal history; in a post-Realist world, the fact
of judicial creativity can no longer be denied. To accept this fact,

however, is not to agree upon its implications for legal practice.
Recent writing in the field of American jurisprudence reflects
conflicting views of the relationship between law and the creative

mind. Some regard judicial lawmaking as a suspect, anti-democratic
enterprise, promoting interpretive norms and institutional changes
designed to minimize judicial discretion.7 Others view the exercise of
"deliberative imagination" as essential to the realization of justice
and lament the bureaucratization of the judiciary, to the extent that it
has reduced judges to the status of case managers. 8 Finally, there are
6. Id. at 260.
7. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
8. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 4 (1993) (noting the ill-effects of bureaucratization, which has "transformed the
ancient art of judging into a species of office management whose main virtue is efficiency rather
than wisdom"); see also JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 4759 (1986) (suggesting the deleterious consequences of bureaucratization of the Supreme Court);
Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983)
(emphasizing the uniqueness of the problem of bureaucratization in the context of the judiciary
because it "tends to corrode the individualistic processes that are the source of judicial
legitimacy"); Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
777, 793 (1981) (expressing concern about the decline of "traditional view of judging as a
'personal' business centering on dialogue and reasoned analysis"); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 377-79 (1982) (exposing the extent to which "managerial judges"
wield unprecedented, unreviewable power in the name of "case management"); William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:Requiem for the
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 341 (1996) (assessing the distributional
consequences of bureaucratization; describing evolution of a two-track justice system, under
which powerful and wealthy litigants receive a disproportionate share of the judges' personal
attention). But cf. Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of
the Federal Courts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68
IOWA L. REV. 871, 878-90 (1983) (identifying flaws in the "bureaucratization thesis" and
maintaining that judges have thus far managed to retain control over the decision-making and
opinion-writing processes even with rise in caseload); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentiousand Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (questioning the magnitude of the
caseload "crisis" in the federal courts); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: BlackRobed Bureaucracy or Collegiality under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 767, 769 (1983)
(criticizing description of judicial branch as "bureaucratic organization" but recognizing need to
"retain the special quality of personalized decision-making that is the historic strength of our
judiciary").
Not all legal scholars have taken such a dim view of bureaucratization and managerial
judging. The salutary effects of these developments are discussed in John H. Langbein, The
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those who seek neither to cabin nor expand judicial discretion,
choosing instead to analyze its concrete manifestations, whether in
terms of efficiency 9 or ideology. 10 These various perspectives nonetheless share the common historical assumption that judicial creativity
was a Realist revelation. In proceeding on such a basis, they have
unwittingly perpetuated Realist myths about the nineteenth-century
legal tradition.
This article views the judge from the perspective of nineteenthcentury legal professionals. Drawing on the legal literature of the
period (broadly construed to include a range of published sources,
from after-dinner speeches to academic articles), it demonstrates that
the creative power of the judge was not only acknowledged but
celebrated well before the emergence of legal realism. Indeed, the
"judicial genius" came to define the professional ideal in the so-called
"Age of Formalism," when mechanical judging was supposed to have
been the norm. This is taken as evidence of the influence of
romanticism in the legal culture of the period-part of a wider
tendency to reformulate sacred ideas, such as the notion of a Creator,
in secular terms. But it is emphasized that the romantic judicial ideal
was not wholly inconsistent with the premises of formalism. Instead, it
reflected tensions at the core of American legal culture, with its
commitments to both individuality and uniformity, spontaneity and
certainty, mercy and justice. Placing Jerome Frank's revelations about
the judge in historical context, it becomes possible to appreciate the
romantic roots of legal realism, as well as the enduring tensions
between law and the creative mind in American culture.
The account offered here diverges in important ways from the
main lines of historiography on the American judicial tradition. One
line, articulated most forcefully by G. Edward White, suggests an
"oracular" theory of judging predominated throughout much of the
nineteenth century, according to which judges were finders rather
than creators of law. 1 By the early decades of this century, however,
German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985), and reasserted in John H.
Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 41
(1997). See also John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1874-75 (1988) (favoring reforms which would permit greater judicial
control of evidence-taking phases of civil and criminal trials).
9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
(1996) (discussing the challenges of an increased federal caseload, the rise of the law clerk as a
consequence, and incremental and fundamental reforms within the federal court system).
10. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997) (addressing the

ideological aspects of adjudication and legal work).
11. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
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White finds that this law-finding model could no longer be squared

with "the discernible impact of judicial decisions on political affairs,"
so that members of the profession were at last forced to acknowledge
the reality "that judges made law."' 2 A second group of historians see

more dynamism in the nineteenth-century tradition, describing a
movement from "instrumentalism" to "formalism" as the dominant
mode of judicial reasoning.

3

According to this account, antebellum

judges moved away from the idea of law as a set of fixed principles
and came to understand their role as innovative policy makers,
shaping legal doctrine so as to facilitate economic development in the

young Republic. Yet by mid-century, judicial opinions began to take
on a more formalist cast, with greater emphasis placed on the
"apolitical, deductive, and 'scientific' character of legal reasoning.' 4
The work of the judge was reconceived as the mechanical application

of abstract doctrines to the cases at bar, without consideration of the
social interests involved. But formalism ultimately proved vulnerable
to Progressive and Realist attacks launched in the period from 1880
to 1920, exposing the discretionary, political character of all legal
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 2, 129-49 (expanded ed. 1988). White maintains that even the
more "innovative" nineteenth-century judges who "modified legal doctrines to respond to
altered economic and social conditions" (Lemuel Shaw and Roger Taney are offered as
exemplars) still fit the description of "oracular." For they "believed that they were not making
law but merely discovering its continual applicability to changing events." Id. at 148; see also G.
Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15
LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 14-15 (1997) (Langdellian legal science recognized "the creative role of
jurists in discovering, formulating, and applying legal principles" but held that principles
themselves "were not of their own creation."); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed
Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 426-32 (1995) (suggesting law-finding
model reached its "maturity" in last decades of nineteenth century, just as dissenting views of
common law "lawmaking" began to emerge).
12. WHITE, supra note 11, at 149. In more recent writing, White has associated this
development with a more general transition from a "premodernist" to "modernist"
epistemological perspective. See White, supra note 11, at 14-15; G. Edward White, The
Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 576, 578-85 (1995); G. Edward White, The "Constitutional Revolution" as a Crisis in
Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867,907-12 (1997).
13. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
1 (1977) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATION I]; see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW (1977); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATION II];
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975)
[hereinafter AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW]; WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF
AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982). For earlier articulations of this position, see
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE (1965); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); and ROSCOE
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
14. TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 13, at 258.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:151

judgments. The third and most recent line of historical scholarship
questions the very utility of such labels as "instrumentalism,"
"formalism," and "realism," providing illustrations of their inadequa-

cy as applied to a particular individual or historical era, and, in some
cases, offering alternative terminology. 5
This article extends the critique of these categories of analysis,
demonstrating that judicial lawmaking was a constant from 1800 to
1930. What changed, it is contended, was the conception of the
creative process entailed in the act of judging. 16 At the turn of the
nineteenth century, creative acts were still primarily associated with
divine power. However, by mid-century, the power of creation was
commonly attributed to human actors- "without necessary reference
to a past divine event.' 1 7 This shift in usage can best be understood as
a manifestation of the influence of romanticism in American culture. 18
15. See, e.g., PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at
253-54 (1992); Stephen Diamond, Citizenship, Civilization and Coercion: Justice Holmes on the
Tax Power, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 115 (Robert W. Gordon ed.,
1992); Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodernto Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of
Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1393 (1997); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism,41 STAN.L. REV. 787, 816, 821-22 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy,
45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 9 (1983) [hereinafter Langdell's Orthodoxy]; Duncan Kennedy, Toward
an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in
America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3, 5 (1980); Harry N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and
Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial Reasoning" in the 19th
Century, 1975 WIs. L. REV.1. The ideological functions of the term "formalism" have also been
explored. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra, at 396 n.15; Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive
Transformation, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 137, 154-57 (1994) [hereinafter The Elusive
Transformation];Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practicein the Age of American
Enterprise,1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70,70-71
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
16. See generally JAMES ENGELL, THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION: ENLIGHTENMENT TO
ROMANTICISM (1981) (tracing crucial shifts in understanding of creative power from 1700
through 1825).
17. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 83
(rev. ed. 1983); see also M.H. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR AND THE LAMP: ROMANTIC THEORY
AND THE CRITICAL TRADITION 272-85 (1953).
18. The ambiguity of the term "romanticism" in both historical and critical literature
cannot be gainsaid. Problems of definition were already apparent by 1836, when Soren
Kierkegaard attacked "'the view that romanticism can be comprehended in one concept, for
romanticism implies overflowing all boundaries."' 4 PETER GAY, THE BOURGEOIS
EXPERIENCE: VICTORIA TO FREUD: THE NAKED HEART 37 (1995) (quoting SoREN
KIERKEGAARD, THE JOURNALS OF SoREN KIERKEGAARD 25 (Alexander Dru ed. & trans.
1938)). The most influential discussion of the problem in this century has been Arthur 0.
Lovejoy's 1923 address to the Modern Language Association, in which he concluded that "[It]he
word 'romantic' has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing." ARTHUR 0.
LOVEJOY, On the Discrimination of Romanticisms, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 228,
232 (1948). Although Lovejoy cast doubt on the prospect of finding a "common denominator"
among these "romanticisms," id. at 236, Ren6 Wellek rose to the challenge in a 1949 essay
entitled The Concept of Romanticism in Literary History. See RENE WELLEK, The Concept of
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The term "romanticism" is used here to refer to a spiritual
transformation in nineteenth-century America-a reconfiguration of
the relationship between the sacred and the secular in a society
buffeted by political revolution, religious awakenings, and industrial

growth. 19 In this unsettling environment, American romantics

Romanticism in Literary History, in CONCEPTS OF CRITICISM 128, 129 (Stephen G. Nichols, Jr.,
ed., 1963) (asserting there is "no basis" for Lovejoy's "extreme nominalism"; arguing that "the
major romantic movements form a unity of theories, philosophies, and style" which "in turn,
form a coherent group of ideas each of which implicates the other"); see also Henry H.H.
Remak, West European Romanticism: Definition and Scope, in COMPARATIVE LITERATURE:
METHOD AND PERSPECTIVE 223, 236 (Newton P. Stallknecht & Horst Frenz eds., 1961)
(assembling proof of "the existence in Western Europe of a widespread, distinct and fairly
simultaneous pattern of thoughts, attitudes and beliefs associated with the connotation
'Romanticism'). Continuing in the spirit of Lovejoy (yet resisting the extremity of his
nominalism), a number of scholars have suggested refinements in usage and documented
historical variations. See, e.g., LILIAN R. FURST, THE CONTOURS OF EUROPEAN ROMANTICISM
2 (1979) (distinguishing between three main "countour lines" of European Romanticism: "the
archetypal, the historical, and the aesthetic"); Introduction to ROMANTICISM IN NATIONAL
CONTEXT 1, 2 (Roy Porter & Mikuld§ Teich eds., 1988) (stressing importance of exploring how
different "national Romanticisms coexisted in symbiotic relations to each other"). Others have
declined Lovejoy's invitation to discriminate among "romanticisms," defending broad-gaged
definitions of the term as both appropriate and workable in historical analysis. See, e.g., M.H.
ABRAMS, NATURAL

SUPERNATURALISM:

TRADITION AND REVOLUTION

IN ROMANTIC

LITERATURE 11-12 (1971) ("economy of discussion" dictates the use of "Romantic" to denote
"a comprehensive intellectual tendency" which manifested itself in philosophy and literature);
ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM 20 (1999) (opining that "unless we do use some
generalisation it is impossible to trace the course of human history" and insisting that "[tihere
was a romantic movement; it did have something that was central to it; it did create a great
revolution in consciousness; and it is important to discover what this is"); 4 GAY, supra, at 38
(acknowledging that "[a]ll attempts to reduce romanticism to an easy formula are mocked by
the imp of the particular" and conceding that "far from being an army of zealots, or even a
school, the romantics created a mood rather than a movement," but averring that "the mood
made history"). As is explained further below, this article follows their lead, conceiving of
romanticism as a determinate historical event, and finding that "romanticism" conveniently
captures a set of themes, values, modes of expression, and ways of thinking and feeling that
were manifest in nineteenth-century American legal literature.
19. Although the emergence of romanticism has been proclaimed "the real American
revolution," Gordon S. Wood, Introduction to THE RISING GLORY OF AMERICA, 1760-1820, at
1, 9 (Gordon S. Wood ed., 1971) (describing the "move from classical republicanism to romantic
democracy" as a "cultural crisis as severe as any in American history" and analyzing it in terms
of political thought), the historiography on the subject remains relatively thin. See HENRY
FARNHAM

MAY,

THE

DIVIDED

HEART:

ESSAYS

ON

PROTESTANTISM

AND

THE

ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 181 (1991) (surveying the literature). The most comprehensive
treatment of the subject to date may be found in ANNE C. ROSE, VICTORIAN AMERICA AND
THE CIVIL WAR (1992). This article builds upon Rose's work as well as a recent wave of
historiography challenging received accounts of the process of secularization in America,
demonstrating religion's persistence throughout the nineteenth century. See, e.g., ROBERT H.
ABZUG, COSMOS CRUMBLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION
(1994); JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
(1990); NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY (1989);
RICHARD RABINOWITZ, THE SPIRITUAL SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PERSONAL RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (1989); JOHN
STAUFFER, THE BLACK HEARTS OF MEN: RACE, RELIGION, AND RADICAL REFORM IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (forthcoming May 1999); Richard Wightman Fox, The
Culture of Liberal Protestant Progressivism, 1875-1925, 23 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 639 (1993);
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struggled to "save traditional concepts, schemes, and values which
had been based on the relation of the Creator to his creature and

creation, but to reformulate them within the prevailing two-term
system of subject and object, ego and non-ego, the human mind or
consciousness and its transactions with nature."20 Consciousness was
reconceived by romantics in organic rather than mechanical terms.
Whereas empirical psychology portrayed the mind as a passive
"reflector of the external world," romantics envisioned the mind as
both "projective and capable of receiving back the fused product of
what it gives and what is given to it."2 According to the new romantic
psychology, perception was itself a creative process; the perceiving

mind recreated the world as it came in contact with it, assimilating
and synthesizing its disparate elements into a new whole. The most
exalted products of the human mind, those characterized by "a
vitality which grows and evolves itself from within," were said to be
works of "genius."22
Historians have left the impression that nineteenth-century
American legal culture was largely impervious to the influence of
romanticism. Lawyers of the young Republic are said to have
stationed "forces of the Head" at the borderlands of law, in order to
23
secure them against the "anarchic impulses of the American Heart.
The success of this campaign was evident by mid-century, these
historians suggest, in that the requisites of the legal profession had
come to be defined in terms of talent, technical reason, and expertise

Daniel Jared Cohen, Symbols of Heaven, Symbols of Man: Pure Mathematics and Victorian
Religion (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author).
Historians of American legal culture have generally assumed a process of secularization
contemporaneous with professionalization, failing to attend to the ways in which religious ideas
and commitments continued to shape legal thought and practice well into the second half of the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN
THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900 (1991); BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE "TRUE
PROFESSIONAL IDEAL" IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (1992). For notable exceptions, see
KARSTEN, supra note 15; and Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST.
REV. 215 (1995).
20. ABRAMS, supra note 18, at 13; see also ROSE, supra note 19, at 9 (finding Abram's
account of English Romanticism applicable in the American context; observing that "American
Victorianism of the mid-nineteenth century contained strong romantic elements of anxiety,
striving, and indulgence in temporal opportunities, all set in motion by religious crisis").
21.

ABRAMS, supra note 17, at 67, 69. See generally L.S. HEARNSHAW, THE SHAPING OF

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 89-107 (1987); DANIEL N. ROBINSON, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
PSYCHOLOGY 321-58 (rev. ed. 1981).
22.

ABRAMS, supra note 17, at 176 (quoting SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, COLERIDGE'S

MISCELLANEOUS CRITICISM 44 n.2 (Thomas Middleton Raysor ed., 1936)).
23.

PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO

THE CIVIL WAR 105 (1965).
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rather than genius, imagination, and art. 24 However as this article
reveals, post-bellum legal professionals were not immune to the
impulses of romanticism. Through an analysis of legal discourse about
the judge between 1800 and 1930, it documents the emergence of a
romantic judicial figure whose judgments were, at once, emanations
of his own mind and expressions of the "rule of law." It draws
particularly on judicial biographies, which were published in growing
numbers over the course of the nineteenth century-a development
itself indicative of a romantic sensibility. Typically written by and for
members of the legal profession, these works communicated shared
understandings of the judicial role. Antebellum judicial biographers
tended to depict the judge as a neoclassical artisan, whose legal
constructions were made from given precedents, in accordance with
the traditions of his craft. However, the outlines of a new judicial
ideal were discernible by mid-century-a romantic author who left his
unique imprint on the law. Biographical tributes to the "judicial
genius" reached a highwater mark during the "Age of Formalism,"
although the ultimate source of his inspiration remained obscure.
With the rise of Legal Realism, references to the "creativity" of the
judge-now denoting a strictly human faculty-became commonplace, and judicial lawmaking was dissociated from divine activity.
Yet ironically the judge's creativity was attributed to the finitude of
his mind; his opinions were inevitably creative because he could never
see with eyes other than his own. Subjectivity, once understood as a
divine attribute implanted in man, was gradually reconceived as a
human limitation, inhibiting the judge's ability to realize the ideal of
scientific objectivity. It now appeared that the judge was imprisoned
in the cell of his own consciousness and had no choice but to be
creative in his rulings. Necessity, after all, was the mother of
invention.
With historical perspective, then, it will become clear that the
existence of a "creative judiciary" was hardly a Realist revelation.
This study is not, however, undertaken simply to explode Realist
myths or to otherwise complicate received accounts of the American
judicial tradition. Its larger aim is to situate legal discourse about the
creative judge within a wider cultural inquiry into consciousness,
24. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 286-87
(1984); see also MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY,
1776-1876, at 136-90 (1976) (legal practitioners in Jacksonian America and the Civil War era
increasingly came to embrace "a narrow vocational outlook toward their work and to insist
upon a technical competence that set them apart from their fellow men," id. at 137).
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demonstrating how new insights in the powers and limitations of the
human mind forced reconsideration of the nature of the judicial role.
Living in "the age of Introversion," 25 nineteenth-century lawyers and
judges joined in the practice of self-analysis and came to appreciate
the mediating role of consciousness in the interpretation of law.2 6 The
legal literature published from 1800 through 1930 reflects growing
awareness of "both the possibilities and the limitations of the shaping
mind ' 27 of the judge. Part I examines the profusion of eulogies,
biographical sketches, and memoirs of judges produced by members
of the legal profession over the course of this period. These works are
conceived as part of a more general flowering of man-and-his-work
criticism in an age known for its "Biographic appetite." 28 Increasingly,
it is argued, the judge was identified as the author of his opinions,
however various the metaphors employed to convey the nature of the
creative process. The implications of this shift in imagery are
considered in the ensuing Parts of the article, attending to the ways
biographers addressed and accounted for their subjects' creative acts.
Parts II, III, and IV illustrate the progression of three main
characterizations of the ideal judge in the professional literature: the
neoclassical craftsman (1800-1850), the romantic author (1850-1900),
and the skeptical jurist (1900-1930). These shifts in imagery suggest
an altered consciousness about consciousness by the early decades of
this century. In Realist portraits of the skeptical judge, consciousness
was more an impediment than a pathway to an objective realm of
truth. However, as the Conclusion observes, Realists did retain more
than a little of their predecessors' idealism, as they too went about
"anthropomorphizing the law." Some closing remarks are offered
concerning the persistent tendency in American culture to personify
25. EMERSON, The American Scholar, supra note 1, at 66.
26. Although the implications of this development have been analyzed in the fields of art,
literature, religion, and philosophy, see, e.g., BRYAN JAY WOLF, ROMANTIC RE-VISION:
CULTURE

AND CONSCIOUSNESS

IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY

AMERICAN

PAINTING

AND

LITERATURE xiv (1982) (demonstrating that ."consciousness was becoming a mode of selfconsciousness" in nineteenth-century America and documenting the manifestations of this new
mentality in both the visual arts and literature); LEON CHAI, THE ROMANTIC FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 4 (1987) (noting new "primacy accorded to consciousness" in
nineteenth-century American literature); JAMES HOOPES, CONSCIOUSNESS IN NEW ENGLAND:
FROM PURITANISM AND IDEAS TO PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SEMIOTIC 95-286 (1989) (tracing
impact of "new concept of consciousness," id. at 1, through nineteenth-century religious and
philosophical discourse); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN IDENTITY 390 (1989) (describing "fundamental" change in conception of human
subject in late eighteenth-century culture), no comparable study has been undertaken in that of
the law.
27. WOLF, supra note 26, at 4.
28. 4 GAY, supra note 18, at 152; see id. at 156-57.
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law's rule in the image of the judge.
I. THE JUDGE AND HIS WORK

If it has grown into an unquestioned truth, that the poorest annals
belong to those epochs which have been the richest in virtue and
happiness, it may well be admitted that the best judge for the
people, is he who imperceptibly maintains them in their rights, and
leaves few striking events for biography.
29
-Horace Binney
The sentiments of Horace Binney were strangely echoed by
Judge Richard Posner at a recent national conference on judicial
biography. According to Judge Posner, aspiring judicial biographers
must confront the difficult task of writing "empathetically and
arrestingly about dullish people who are not introspective."3 0 Posner's
discouraging characterization of the enterprise of judicial biography is
not, however, simply grounded in his view of judges as relatively
uninteresting subjects. Indeed, what he finds true of prominent judges
also applies to most "brilliant, creative people": their lives are marked
by "a disconnection of achievement from self."31 The only insight the
biographer can provide regarding "the springs of genius," he insists, is
"what should have been obvious all along: that highly successful
people in any field tend to take their work very seriously, at least
while they are doing it ... and that outside their (often very narrow)
'3 2
area of achievement creative people are just like ordinary people.
In underscoring this disconnection between self and work, Posner
ultimately shows himself to be far removed from the assumptions and
aims of Binney and other nineteenth-century judicial biographers.3 3 In
recounting the life of a judge, these biographers expressed their belief
that a man and his work were mutually defining and that there was
much to be learned-about their profession and themselves-through
studying the relation between the two.34
29. Horace Binney, Life of ChiefJustice Tilghman, 1 AM. L. MAG. 1, 30 (1843).
30. Richard A. Posner, JudicialBiography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502, 516 (1995).
31. Id. at 507, 508.
32. Id. at 508.
33. Arguably, he also diverges from his contemporaries in this respect. See Linda
Przybyszewski, The Dilemma of Judicial Biography or Who Cares Who Is the Great Appellate
Judge? Gerald Gunther on Learned Hand, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135 (1996) (noting the
predominant tendency among post-Realist judicial biographers to account for the "greatness" of
a subject's achievements through analysis of his personal qualities and life circumstances).
34. For a typical expression of the importance of biography in nineteenth-century legal
literature, see Biography, 1 AM. L.J. 121 (1808). The editor of this journal proclaims the

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:151

While it may be conceded that judicial biographies often lack

dramatic appeal, they nonetheless constitute an important historical
source, illuminating changing conceptions of the judicial role and the
processes of ideological formation within the American legal
profession." The genre of judicial biography took shape in the early
Republic, with the publication of eulogies and pamphlets extolling the
virtues of prominent members of the judiciary as well as those of the
rank and file. 36 These works were typically written by members of the
legal profession-often family members or colleagues of the (usually
deceased) subjects. The inclination to commit these "lives" to print
was part of a more general "mania" for biography that gripped the

country in this period.37 However, for purposes of this article, the
"intrinsic importance" of biographical sketches, asserting that "[n]o pursuit is more worthy the
attention of the liberal scholar than that which leads him into the interior recesses of the
studious, and unfolds to his inquisitive research the restless operations of genius." Id. Such
sketches are said to rouse the reader from "inactivity to exertion, and summon him to vindicate
the honour of his nature." Id. Accordingly, the editor concludes that he "requires no apology"
for devoting space to them and solicits memoirs of American lawyers and judges from his
readers in order to show "an envious world that America is not less the nurse of liberty than the
cradle of glory." Id.
35. It should be emphasized that this is not, properly speaking, a genre study. Judicial
biography stands at the center of this article because it was perhaps the most common medium
through which judges and lawyers in this period communicated their views about the judicial
office and their expectations of its occupants. The approach taken here nonetheless follows
those scholars who explored the "cultural work" performed by popular literary forms. Rather
than assessing judicial biographies from a literary standpoint, this article seeks to understand the
ways in which they were used to create and propagate meaning within the legal culture. For
works employing a similar approach to "non-canonical" literature, see, e.g., SCoTr E. CASPER,
CONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LIVES: BIOGRAPHY AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1999); DANIEL A. COHEN, PILLARS OF SALT, MONUMENTS OF GRACE: NEW
ENGLAND CRIME LITERATURE AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE, 16741860 (1993); CATHY N. DAVIDSON, REVOLUTION AND THE WORD; THE RISE OF THE NOVEL
IN AMERICA (1986); MICHAEL DENNING, MECHANIC ACCENTS: DIME NOVELS AND
WORKING-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA (1987); JUDY HILKEY, CHARACTER IS CAPITAL:
SUCCESS MANUALS AND MANHOOD IN GILDED AGE AMERICA (1997); DAVID S. REYNOLDS,
BENEATH THE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE: THE SUBVERSIVE IMAGINATION IN THE AGE OF
EMERSON AND MELVILLE (1988); and JANE TOMPKINS, SENSATIONAL DESIGNS: THE

CULTURAL WORK OF AMERICAN FICTION, 1790-1860 (1985).
36. The genre of biography is here understood to embrace not only full-length books
treating a single subject but also collective biographies and a range of shorter character
sketches, eulogies, and tributes published in pamphlet form or periodical literature. For studies
adopting a similar approach, see CASPER, supra note 35; and Michael T. Gilmore, Eulogy as
Symbolic Biography: The Iconography of Revolutionary Leadership, 1776-1826, in STUDIES IN
BIOGRAPHY 131 (Daniel Aaron ed., 1978).
37. See CASPER, supra note 35, at 1-2; Joyce Appleby, New Cultural Heroes in the Early
National Period, in THE CULTURE OF THE MARKET: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 163 (Thomas L.
Haskell & Richard F. Teichgraeber III eds., 1993). In accounting for this widespread
enthusiasm, historians have pointed to the political, economic, religious, and cultural
transformations of the antebellum period. These transformations disrupted traditional patterns
of life and "encouraged people to think of themselves as free agents, characters in the making
(and on the make) on stages of their own devising." CASPER, supra note 35, at 14; see also
Appleby, supra, at 171-72. Moreover, the popular literature of the period-including novels as
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biographies of judges are most usefully read against the backdrop of
an emerging body of "man and his work criticism," reflecting new
understandings of the artist's mind and the creative process.38 To be
sure, biographies of judges also shared much in common with the
popular "lives" of statesmen, military officers, political candidates,
merchants, and other "self-made" men that proliferated during the
same period. Indeed, in a certain sense, these popular lives might also
be viewed as studies of a man and his work. Yet the connections
between judicial and literary biographies were especially close
because both came to focus on the written work of their subjects and
served not only as tools of instruction and amusement (the chief aims
39
of popular biographies), but as vehicles of criticism as well.
The relationship between a man and his work had not been of
primary concern to eighteenth-century literary critics. Drawing upon
the empirical psychology of the day, they viewed the artist's mind as a
mechanism that reflected images of objects perceived. 40 Because the
artist himself was simply "an agent who holds a mirror up to nature,"
critics found little "theoretical room for the intrusion of personal
traits into his product." They focused instead on the work itself and

well as biographies (and autobiographies) -expressed and thereby reinforced the notion of an
individual as author and protagonist of his life. The experience of reading this literature spurred
"more and more people to believe that they and their kin had life stories, indeed life stories
worth telling." CASPER, supra note 35, at 15; see also 4 GAY, supra note 18, at 152 ("Nineteenthcentury readers were sensitive to living in a time of lives examined and lives told."). Although
statesmen and military heroes continued to command more than their share of biographers
throughout the century, the lives of the less illustrious were also published in increasing
numbers. On the emergence of autobiography in this period, see JAMES Cox, Autobiography
and America, in RECOVERING LITERATURE'S LOST GROUND: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 11, 14 (1989) (observing that the term "autobiography" was first used in 1809
"just after the age of revolution, when the modern self was being liberated as well as defined").
38. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101 (Josu6
V. Harari trans., Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). Historians have linked the appearance of literary
biographies in this period to changes in the material circumstances of literary activity,
particularly improvements in print technology and the replacement of a system of aristocratic
patronage with one of capitalist production and exchange. See, e.g., Michael McKeon, Writer as
Hero: Novelistic Prefigurationsand the Emergence of Literary Biography, in CONTESTING THE
SUBJECT: ESSAYS IN THE POSTMODERN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BIOGRAPHY AND
BIOGRAPHICAL CRITICISM 17, 22 (William H. Epstein ed., 1991). These developments have
been further related to changes in the realm of copyright law. See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS
AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 121 (1993); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius
and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author', 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425,426 (1984).
39. See CASPER, supra note 35, at 10 (distinguishing popular from literary biographies).
40. See ABRAMS, supra note 17, at 160. Abrams cites Alexander Gerard's description as
typical: "'Like a mirrour, it reflects faithful images of the objects formerly perceived by us.... It
is in its nature a mere copier....' Id. (quoting ALEXANDER GERARD, AN ESSAY ON GENIUS
28 (London, W. Strahan 1774)).
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its relation to the world it reflected and the audience it affected. 41 This
mechanical theory of the mind was subject to revision over the course
of the century, however, as a growing number of critics affirmed the
existence of active, innate powers of the mind-particularly the
faculty of imagination. By the close of the century, a romantic view of
the mind's role in perception could be discerned in the critical
literature, expressed most vividly through a new set of metaphors of
mind: the lamp, fountain, and living plant. These various metaphors
all served to emphasize that the content of perception was "the joint
product of external data and of mind," so that the "perceiving mind
discovers what it has itself partly made. '42 In accordance with this
view, critics increasingly focused upon the mental constitution of the
artist and regarded his work as a revelation of personality. Indeed,
critics came to speak of the artist as a "creator" of sorts-one who
emulated God in the production of a "second nature. '43 And they
tended to draw connections between the artist's work and his
biography, not unlike the manner in which theologians had
traditionally approached "the book of nature," seeking to find therein
"marks of the divine author's personality." 44
As the theory of mind shifted in the critical discourse, so too did
the model of literary production. As Martha Woodmansee explains, a
"neoclassical" model reigned through much of the eighteenth
century, although it was a rather "unstable marriage" between two
distinct concepts. 45 First and foremost, the neoclassical artist was a
craftsman who manipulated the ideas obtained through sensory
perception according to a "body of rules, preserved and handed down
to him in rhetoric and poetics ... in order to achieve the effects
prescribed by the cultivated audience of the court." 46 Yet there were
"rare moments" when this artist "managed to rise above the requirements of the occasion to achieve something higher." In such cases, he
was said to be "inspired-by some muse, or even by God. 47 Over the
course of the century, Woodmansee observes, critics gradually
minimized the element of craftsmanship and internalized the source
of inspiration, so that it was regarded as "emanating not from outside
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 226.
Id. at 62, 58.
See id. at 272-85.
ROSE, supra note 38, at 121.
See Woodmansee, supra note 38, at 425, 426.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 426-27.
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or above, but from within the writer himself. '' 48 The outlines of a new,
romantic model of authorship began to appear: The artist was now
conceived of as an "original genius" whose work was a spontaneous
production emanating from his own mind under the impulse of
feeling. 49 This romantic author was a creative actor, guided by laws of
his own origination. And he was considered "distinctly and personally
responsible for his creation."50

In his cultural analysis of the "fundamental unit of the author
and the work," Michel Foucault notes that the kinds of texts requiring

attribution to an author have not remained constant over time." Prior
to the eighteenth century, he contends, literary texts "were accepted,
put into circulation, and valorized without any question about the
identity of their author," while those of a more scientific character
were "accepted as 'true,' only when marked with the name of their
author."52 Yet over the course of the eighteenth century, a reversal
occurred. Literary anonymity was no longer tolerable, whereas
scientific discourses "began to be received for themselves, in the

anonymity of an established or always redemonstrable truth; their
membership in a systematic ensemble, and not the reference to the
individual who produced them, stood as their guarantee. 51 3 However
accurate as a general historical matter 5 4 Foucault's discussion
provides a useful and suggestive framework within which to consider
conceptions of the authorship in American legal culture. 5 For what is
striking about legal discourse from 1800 to 1930 is the extent to which

48. Id. at 427; see also ABRAMS, supra note 17, at 275 (noting how eighteenth-century
critics "took the creative act indoors and delegated it to the faculty of imagination").
49. See Woodmansee, supra note 38, at 427.
50. Id.
51. See FOUCAULT, supra note 38, at 109.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. For criticisms on historical grounds, see, e.g., Roger Chartier, Figures of the Author, in
OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 7, 21-22 (Brad Sherman & Alain
Strowel eds., 1994) (questioning whether there was such a reversal as between literary and
scientific discourses in the eighteenth century); and Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology
and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France,1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109, 117
(1990) (suggesting that ideas about authorship were more various and conflicted than Foucault's
account suggests, uncovering tension in eighteenth-century France between idea of author as
"original creator and hence inviolable proprietor of his works" and that of author as "passive
midwife to the disclosure of objective knowledge").
55. Foucault's work on authorship is discussed as part of a general examination of the
conceptual commitments entailed in the ideal of the rule of law in PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN
OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 103-33 (1997)
(arguing "[tihere is no formal place under the rule of law for giving simultaneous recognition to
authority and authorship," id. at 107).
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it vacillates between the two orientations toward authorship
identified by Foucault-sometimes tolerating anonymity, other times
requiring an individual author. But to the extent an author is
required, it is the judge who comes to fill the role. The evolution of
the genre of judicial biography reflects this development;
characterizations of the work of the judge shift from a model of
neoclassical craftsmanship to one of romantic authorship. The
American Republic is said to be ruled by laws and not men, yet the
"rule of law" is increasingly embodied in the figure of the individual
56
judge.

II.

THE CHARACTER OF THE JUDGE,

1800-1850

Having thus traced his progress down to the acceptance of his last
office, I proceed to some selections from his published opinions, for

the purpose of illustrating his judicial character. I am aware of the
hazard of such an attempt. It is like undertaking to exhibit the

genius of a sculptor, by means of an arm separated from its trunk,
or of a painter, by a handful snatched from the canvass.
-

William Porter 57

Above all else, the nineteenth-century judicial biography was a
testament to the subject's exemplary character. The didactic tone of
these publications was especially pronounced in the antebellum
period. 58 "I have set forth an example, to be followed by parents in
training their children, by young men in the course of their education,
and by all in public life," advised the author of The Life of Hon.
Nathaniel Chipman (1846). 59 Written in the mold of Plutarch's
56. As Robert A. Ferguson has observed, "the American judge is by definition a
compromise of contending considerations that is easier to describe than to order." The judge is
expected to embody all at once "the prince, the olympian, the communal elder, and the
historian-philosopher-prophet." Ferguson does not, however, consider the extent to which the
composition of the "judicial figure" has changed over time in American culture, beyond noting
that skepticism about the objectivity of the judge has grown in this century. See Robert A.
Ferguson, Holmes and the JudicialFigure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 511 (1988).
57. WILLIAM A. PORTER, AN ESSAY ON THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OF JOHN
B. GIBSON, LL.D. 62 (Philadelphia, T. & JW. Johnson 1855).
58. This was in line with the development of the genre as a whole. See CASPER, supra note
35, at 87 ("[D]idacticism was unquestionably the most common purpose of biography between
1820 and 1860.").
59. DANIEL CHIPMAN, THE LIFE OF HON. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, LL.D.: FORMERLY
MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, AND CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF VERMONT iv

(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846). As was typical of biographers in the didactic
mode, he offered prefatory remarks about the utility of his work and of biography in general:
To write a panegyric would, in this case, savor of vanity, and is in no case very useful,
without setting forth the early training and early acquired habits which contributed to
form the character of the person eulogized, as an example to be followed by the rising
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Parallel Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, they were
encomiums designed "to encourage virtue and discourage vice in
public life," often reading like "homilies" or "biographical Sunday

school lessons." 6 However, by mid-century, judicial biographies
began to assume a more "romantic" form, providing "the full-bodied

story of a life"-a more intimate portrait of the person in all his
"idiosyncrasy."6 1 In these works, the individual judge's "constructive"

role in the development of the Republic's jurisprudence figured more
prominently. This can, in large part, be attributed to improvements in
the reporting system and the growth of legal literature, which made

judicial opinions more accessible. Increasingly, biographers turned to
published reports as the primary illustration of "judicial character."
As a result, the image of the ideal judge as a writer came to hold a
central place in legal discourse. "After all," said Chief Justice Lemuel

Shaw of his colleague Isaac Parker, "his judicial character must stand
decisions, which now form
upon the published reports of his judicial
'62
so large a portion of our legal learning.

The importance of "character" in nineteenth-century American
culture can hardly be overstated. "By 1800," Warren Susman has
observed, "the concept of character had come to define that
particular modal type felt to be essential for the maintenance of the
social order. '63 Americans perceived a vacuum of authority in the
early Republic, as "the hierarchical social institutions of seventeenthand eighteenth-century America" were giving way to "the more

tenuous authority possible within the egalitarian social organizations
of the nineteenth century." 64 Clerics, educators, and public moralists
generation. Such is, undoubtedly, the legitimate purpose of biography.
Id. at iv-v. For an illuminating analysis of nineteenth-century biographies written in a didactic
vein, see CASPER, supra note 35, at 19-124.
60. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS 585, 586 (1992); see also CASPER, supra note 35,
at 32 (noting didactic and nationalistic aims of antebellum biographies and tracing their origins
to Plutarch's Lives).
61. BOORSTIN, supra note 60, at 586; see also CASPER, supra note 35, at 203-20 (describing
critical redefinition of genre at mid-century as new emphasis is placed on qualities of mind and
action which made each individual unique).
62. Lemuel Shaw, An Address Delivered Before the Bar of Berkshire, in 5 AM. JURIST &
L. MAG. 5, 16 (1831).
63. Warren I. Susman, "Personality" and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture,in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 212, 213-14 (John Higham & Paul K.
Conkin eds., 1979).
64. KAREN HALTIUNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF
MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830-1870, at 23 (1982); see also CASPER, supra note
35, at 88-89 (describing disruptions of traditional patterns of life occasioned by political
revolution, religious revivalism, and spread of market economy); Appleby, supra note 37, at
170-71 (same).
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articulated their fears within a declension framework: "'We have
fallen on a period of social disorders, agitations, and excitements.
There are signs of a spirit of anarchy in the very midst of us, which
makes us sometimes tremble for the weal of our institutions. ' ' 61 In the
midst of this crisis of authority, Karen Halttunen explains,
"Americans came to believe that the republic's only chance for
survival lay in the character of the rising generation.

' 66

It is thus not

surprising that one finds a burgeoning literature of "character studies
providing examples for emulation" and advice manuals "promising a
way to character development and worldly success," particularly in
the antebellum period. 67 These publications presented a "method for
both mastery and development of the self."'' They also supplied a
"method of presenting the self to society, offering a standard of
conduct ' 69
that assured interrelationship between the 'social' and the
'moral.'
But the writers' concept of character was itself ultimately
"founded on an inner contradiction," according to Susman. For they
"argued that the highest development of self ended in a version of
self-control or self-mastery, which often meant fulfillment through
sacrifice in the name of a higher law, ideals of duty, honor, integrity.
'70
One came to selfhood through obedience to laws and ideals.
The biographies extolling the "judicial character" of their subjects were, in a sense, a species of this advice literature.71 Indeed,
65. ARTEMUS B. MUZZEY, THE YOUNG MAN'S FRIEND 119 (Boston, J. Munroe 1838),
quoted in HALTTUNEN, supra note 64, at 21.
66. HALTrUNEN, supra note 64, at 10.
67. Susman, supra note 63, at 214; see also HILKEY, supra note 35, at 126 (describing range
of nineteenth-century literature emphasizing "importance and expedience of character");
THOMAS E. JENKINS, THE CHARACTER OF GOD: RECOVERING THE LOST LITERARY POWER
OF AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 6 (1997) (noting widespread assumption in nineteenth-century
American culture that literature "not only was a guide to character but also could influence
character"); Roberta J. Park, Biological Thought, Athletics, and the Formation of a 'Man of
Character': 1830-1900, in MANLINESS AND MORALITY: MIDDLE-CLASS MASCULINITY IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 1800-1940, at 7, 13, 17 (J.A. Mangan & James Walvin eds., 1987)
(documenting work of American educators and social reformers who trumpeted "characterforming potential of exercise and athletics").
68. Susman, supra note 63, at 214.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 220.
71. Peter Gay has suggested such a link in his discussion of the "anxious didacticism"
manifest in nineteenth-century popular literature:
I have called the Victorian age an age of advice, and biographies had their part to play
in a vast literature of printed sermons, medical treatises, handbooks on conduct, ragsto-riches novels, counsels to the lonely, the young, the masturbator, the aspiring
merchant. Indeed, biographies resembled both the novels and the exhortations, but,
unlike the first, they claimed to be true and, unlike the second, they enforced their
message not with sweeping precepts but with concrete instances .... [Bliographies
were at heart supreme success stories. Victorian lives were many things, but a sizable
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these works were clearly intended to serve a useful social function-

providing models and methods of self-development likely to enhance
one's reputation before both man and God. And they relied upon the
same contradictory formulation of character, so that the ideal judge
was portrayed as one who achieved self-mastery through submission
to the rule of the law. But the promotion of "judicial character" was
also a particular response of lawyers to the problem of order in
antebellum America. The legitimacy of the legal profession and
judicial authority was hardly secure in post-Revolutionary America.

Of primary concern was "[t]he problem of fitting the common law
into an emerging system of popular sovereignty.

7 2 The

position of the

judiciary was especially precarious. Due to the low salaries and the
hardships of riding circuit, the bench did not attract the most capable
members of the profession, and was populated with a substantial

number of laymen.73 Lawyers and judges in the early Republic
mounted an impressive and largely successful campaign to establish
their status as a learned profession.7 4 And they succeeded in expand-

ing the province of the judge at the expense of the jury through
institutional and procedural reforms.75 But these measures did not
receive universal applause from legal professionals or the public at
large; they were subject to a considerable amount of resistance and
contingent among them were advice proffered through examples.... Varied though
their menu, these guides to a better life were as one in this: they aimed to mold
character.
4 GAY, supra note 18, at 160; see also CASPER, supra note 35, at 88 (viewing popular lives and
collective biographies of merchants, mechanics, and "self-taught" men as part and parcel of a
"cultural mission" to shape individual and national character, reflecting rising social concern
about "moral free agents").
72. TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 13, at 20. According to Horwitz, American jurists
displaced the revolutionary generation's understanding of common law doctrines as derived
from "natural principles of justice" in the period from 1780 to 1820, promoting a more
"instrumental" conception of law. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, he finds the powers
of the judge expanded at the expense of the jury, and contends that by 1820 judges had come to
conceive of the common law as "equally responsible with legislation for governing society and
promoting socially desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as an instrument of policy
encouraged innovation and allowed judges to formulate legal doctrine with the self-conscious
goal of bringing about social change." Id. at 30. As will be seen below, this instrumentalist judge
contrasts rather sharply with the judges figured in biographies of the same period.
73. See Ren~e B. Lettow, New Trialfor Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early
Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 519 (1996).
74. See John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 547,567 (1993).
75. The major institutional innovation of the period was the establishment of a trial and
appellate system which "increased the law's predictability [and] also gave judges more power
over juries." Lettow, supra note 73, at 519. Judges also utilized the procedural mechanism of
ordering new trials for verdicts against the law or evidence as a means of exerting authority over
the jury in an ideologically acceptable fashion. See id. at 506, 521-26; see also
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 13.
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hostility on the part of those who promoted (successfully) the election
of judges and urged simplification of the law. 76 The biographies
extolling the "judicial character" of their subjects answered these
attacks, suggesting that the judge exemplified and preserved legal
order. Thus they may be read not only as manuals of instruction, but
also as acts of self-justification on the part of the bench and bar.
This Part explores the significance of "judicial character" in
antebellum legal culture. It begins by reconstructing the image of the
exemplary judge as it was projected in the biographical literature. The
judge was predominantly figured as a craftsman of the law or a
medium through which the law was expressed. According to this
neoclassical model of adjudication, the rendering of a judgment
entailed the self-abnegation of the judge. By the middle of the
century, however, a more romantic conception of authorship was
discernable in some biographical works. This romantic vision
constituted a fundamental threat to the notion of judicial character
elaborated by antebellum legal biographers. For if the judge was the
author of the law, was he not acting rather imperiously-rendering
judgments according to his own dictates? How were the romantic
judge's legal judgments to be distinguished from expressions of
prejudice or raw egotism? The ways in which judicial biographers
answered - or evaded - these questions are examined in Part III.
A. The Antebellum Portrait
The lives and times of antebellum American judges were
remarkably uniform, if the judicial biographies of the period are any
indication. There is, indeed, a formulaic quality to these works. They
begin by tracing the ancestry of the judge, making note of patriotic
relatives. 77 Next we learn of the educational background of the judge,
76. For accounts of the ways in which political and legal controversies shaped conceptions
of the judiciary in the early Republic, see RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:
COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971); MILLER, supra note 23, at 99-265; and
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 1-156

(abr. ed. 1991). For a somewhat divergent interpretation of the campaign for an elective
judiciary, see Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State ConstitutionalReform and the Rise of
an Elected Judiciary,1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337 (1983).
77. Judge Samuel Putnam was especially well-connected to the Revolution. He was both
"distantly related to the celebrated General Israel Putnam," and a contributor to the war effort
in his own right: "He saw the soldiers under Arnold as they were going down to attack Quebec
... [and] even at his tender age ... could play the fife for them as they marched by." CYRUS
AUGUSTUS BARTOL, A DISCOURSE ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF SAMUEL PUTNAM
LL.D., A.A.S., LATE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 5

(Boston, Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1853). In a similar fashion, we are told that Judge Jonas Platt
was a son of Zephania Platt of Poughkeepsie
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which usually involved some exposure to the classics from an early
age, and often included formal

collegiate studies. Very soon

thereafter, we find him studying law in the office of a distinguished
judge or lawyer, having displayed little or no anxiety about his choice

of vocation. Admission to the bar (and, usually, marriage) likewise
follow as a matter of course. It would appear that some men are
simply "bred to the law.

'78

Invariably, the judge's "talents and

industry soon acquired for him a rank in that profession, and an
amount of practice, which are rarely attained until after a long period

of patient exertion and laborious study."7 9
The biographer is more measured in his praise of the judges'
arguments before the court, which are referred to as respectable, if
not compelling displays of forensic skill.8 ° In any event, we are told, it

was not long before the judge was "pressed" into public life,
performing a variety of roles, from legislator, to marshal, to brigadier
general of the cavalry. 81 "The several offices of trust and responsibility
which he was soon called to fill by executive appointment, and by the

suffrages of the people," the biographer observes, "attested the
confidence which was universally placed in his judgment, fidelity, and
capacity in the transaction of business." 82
All of this, of course, is but prologue to the moment when he is

called to assume the seat of judgment. At this point in the narrative,
the biographer considers his subject's judicial character at some
one of the revered and intrepid patriots of the Revolution ...who was a member of
the New York Convention of 1776, and of the Council of Safety in 1777, and a delegate
to Congress under the old Confederation. He was also first judge of the Court of
Common Pleas for Dutchess county.., down to the year 1795.
Judge Platt, 11 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 488, 488 (1834) (obituary notice for Judge Jonas Platt).
The socioeconomic background of the judges is difficult to reduce to a generalization from
the biographies. Some judges were said to come from "ancient and respectable" families, others
from more "humble" origins. Compare OLIVER SPENCER HALSTED, ADDRESS UPON THE
CHARACTER OF THE LATE THE HON. ISAAC H. WILLIAMSON 7 (Newark, Aaron Guest 1844)
with Shaw, supra note 62, at 6.
78. Obituary Notice of the Hon. Bushrod Washington, Late One of the Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 3 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 156, 156 (1830) [hereinafter
Obituary Notice of the Hon. Bushrod Washington].
79. Shaw, supra note 62, at 7.
80. As Horace Binney recalls Chief Justice Tilghman:
He was concise, simple, occasionally nervous, and uniformly faithful to the court, as he
was to the client. But the force of his intellect resided in his judgment; and even higher
faculties than his as an advocate, would have been thrown comparatively into the
shade, by the more striking light which surrounded his path as a judge.
Binney, supra note 29, at 5.
81. See Memoir of Judge Trimble, 1 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 149, 154 (1829); see also Judge
Platt, supra note 77, at 489.
82. Shaw, supra note 62, at 7.
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length, delineating the exemplary qualities of his heart and mind.
"But the life of a judge, however active, laborious, and useful, is filled
with little incident," 83 the biographer reminds us, as he draws his
account to a close. During his entire term of office, we are assured,
the judge served with distinction and his "integrity as an officer and a
man was never called in question." 84 Christianity always figures
somewhere in the background-never directly informing the judge's
decisions but providing a helpful source of "fundamental truths."85 In
detailing the final days of the judge, the biographer notes that the
dying man remained lucid to his last breath. Biography then shades
into hagiography:
We may well rejoice, therefore, that a life, so long and so useful,
should have come to its close without any exhibition of human
infirmity.... His setting sun loomed out in cloudless splendour, as
it sunk below the horizon. The last lights shot up with a soft and
balmy transparency, as if the beams, while yet reflected back on
86
this world, were but ushering in the mom of his own immortality.
The image of the ideal judge that emerges from this literature
suggests the twin influences of neoclassicism and liberal
Protestantism. Consider Joseph Story's commendation of Chief
Justice Parker (1831): "[I]t is difficult to combine so many valuable
qualities in a single character .. . as a judge, he was eminent for
sagacity, acuteness, wisdom, impartiality, and dignity; as a citizen, for
public spirit, and elevated consistency of conduct; as a man, for
generosity, gentleness, and moral purity."87 There is in this idealization of Parker evidence of a neoclassical sensibility, in that Shaw
expresses faith in an ordered rationalism, confirms the congruency
between the moral and the legal, and validates social conformity over
and above natural impulse and imagination. 88 Yet this portrait of the
83. Id. at 12.
84. Memoir of Judge Trimble, supra note 81, at 155.
85. Of Judge Platt it was said: "Before he had entered into public life his mind had been
led to the study and contemplation of those great and fundamental truths of Christianity which
relate to our future destiny, and are undoubtedly the most momentous that can engage the
attention or command the reverence of mankind." Judge Platt, supra note 77, at 491; see also
Binney, supra note 29, at 30 ("[It was to no poetical deity, nor to the counsels of his own mind,
but to that 'grace' which his supplications invoked, that he owed his protection from most of the
lapses to which fallible man is subject.").
86. Joseph Story, Life of Chief Justice Marshall,1 AM. L. MAG. 243, 301 (1843) (delivered
on Oct. 15, 1835, before the Suffolk Bar).
87. Justice Story, Characterof ChiefJustice Parker,5 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 17, 20 (1831).
88. This formulation of neoclassicism draws on the following studies: WALTER JACKSON
BATE, FROM

CLASSIC TO ROMANTIC:

PREMISES OF TASTE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

ENGLAND (1946); LAWRENCE BUELL, NEW ENGLAND LITERARY CULTURE FROM
REVOLUTION THROUGH RENAISSANCE 84-102 (1986); FERGUSON, supra note 24, at 72-78;
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judge also mirrors liberal theologians' characterizations of God in the
nineteenth century. In contradistinction to the juristic tradition, in
which God was imagined "as feeling both love and wrath as he
rewarded the righteous and punished the guilty," these theologians
simplified and unified God's feelings into a "more emotionally
singular charcterization" of "love above all else." 89 They adopted an
anti-anthropomorphic, theistic conception of God-one which
emphasized his lack of "inner conflict or complexity." 9 Ironically, just
as liberal theologians were replacing images of God as a judge with
those of Him as a loving Father, legal biographers seemed to be
figuring the ideal judge in His benevolent image. This is not to say
that judicial biographers were raising the judge up to some sort of
godlike station. No one thought that antebellum judges were anything
other than human-the judge always comported himself modestly,
displaying all due reverence and deference to the Judge. Idealization,
after all, is not the same thing as deification. The similarity in the
characterization of God and the judge has more to do with the fact
that these theologians and lawyers shared a common conception of
human nature -one which called for the benevolence of the judge, no
less than the Judge. 9'
A closer examination of the concept of "judicial character" in
antebellum legal literature provides further clarification of this ideal.
As used by legal biographers, the term was usually meant to be both
descriptive and prescriptive. 92 Over the course of the antebellum
period, a broad consensus may be detected among legal biographers
of the period as to the constituent elements of judicial character. For
purposes of this discussion, they will be reduced to four: (1)
impartiality, (2) benevolence, (3) sagacity, and (4) artless simplicity.
In speaking of judicial character, biographers referred primarily to
the qualities the judge displayed when acting publicly, in his official
capacity. The judge's character off the bench received far less
attention from antebellum biographers. Yet their readers could rest

JENKINS, supra note 67; M.F. Heiser, The Decline of Neoclassicism, 1801-1848, in TRANSITIONS
IN AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY 93 (Harry Hayden Clark ed., 1967).

89. JENKINS, supra note 67, at 26.
90. Id. at 39. For an interesting reflection on the character of the judge written by a cleric,
see BARTOL, supra note 77, at 8.
91. More generally, these characterizations enjoyed intellectual and social support from
enlightenment science and humanitarian morality, which pervaded cosmopolitan American
culture in this period. See JENKINS, supra note 67, at 7-8, 50, 138-39.
92. On occasion, "judicial character" was used to refer to the individual judge himself, as
well as to the set of qualities possessed by the same.
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assured "that there was no contrariety between his judgments and his
life,-that there was a perfect consent between his public and his
private manners."9 3 Much like the liberal theologian's God, the
biographer's judge was marked by the serenity and consistency of his
character. This neoclassical figure seemed to transcend the strife of
the marketplace and the rancor of the political arena, embodying a
shared set of virtues and holding out the promise that "capitalism and
94
democracy would not atomize society into a war of all against all."
Impartiality referred to the ability of a judge to distance himself
from party politics as well as the passions of litigants. The Life of
Hon. Nathaniel Chipman provides a typical illustration of this
attribute, though examples could certainly be multiplied. Chapter IX
described his assumption of the post of Chief Justice of the Vermont
Supreme Court in 1813. Of course, his popular election "arose from,
and followed, the performance of his judicial duties." 95 In support of
this proposition, Chipman's biographer cited the testimony of an
unidentified but "eminent jurist":
I was in considerable practice during the different times that
Nathaniel Chipman was chief justice, and I can truly say, that in
times of the greatest party excitement, I never heard an intimation,
nor even a whisper, expressing a doubt as to the talents,
independence, and impartiality of Judge Chipman.... Every one,
both counsel and parties, had the fullest confidence that every case
would be decided according to law and the justice of the case, and
his decisions seldom failed of giving entire satisfaction to all
concerned. 96
This posture of neutrality was sharply distinguished from the
"manner of the advocate." 9' From the moment Chipman left his
practice to take a seat upon the bench, he "never argued the case in
charging the jury ... from his habitual regard for truth, he did it in
such manner as to satisfy all who heard him ... it was done with
perfect impartiality." Interestingly, Justice Chipman's own explanation of his behavior (as recalled by his biographer) was more
93. Binney, supra note 29, at 23-24.
94. JENKINS, supra note 67, at 8. For illustrations of the tension between republican and
liberal ideals in early republican and antebellum literature, see CASPER, supra note 35, at 77-124
(observing the ways biographers "combined, often uneasily, the virtues associated with civic life
and with self-made success," id. at 77).
95. CHIPMAN, supra note 59, at 195.
96. Id. at 196. A similar conception of impartiality is expressed in an editorial criticizing a
"Judge Barbour," who delivered public speeches regarding the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Acts and displayed behavior "less befitting a judge than a political leader." Judge
P.P. Barbour'sValedictory to his Constituents,5 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 223 (1831).
97. CHIPMAN, supra note 59, at 197.
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strategic: "He used to remark, that ... if he did [argue the case], the
jury would undertake to argue it also, and in their view, their own
arguments would outweigh his." 98
Impartiality, however, did not imply indifference. The sympathies of the judge were bound to be awakened by the cases at the bar,
and he was not expected to suppress them completely. The
benevolence of the judge was vividly conveyed in Horace Binney's
sketch of Chief Justice Tilghman:
His own exemption from moral infirmity, might be supposed to
have made him severe in his reckonings with the guilty; but it is the
quality of minds as pure as his, to look with compassion upon those
who have fallen from virtue. He could not but pronounce the
sentence of the law upon such as were condemned to hear it; but
the calmness, the dignity, the impartiality, with which he ordered
their trials, the deep attention which he gave to such as involved
life, and the touching manner of his last office to the convicted,
demonstrated his sense of the peculiar responsibility which
belonged to this part of his functions.... [I]n criminal cases, there
was a constant reference to the wretched persons whose fate was
suspended before him; and in the very celerity with which he
endeavoured to dispose of the accusation, he evinced his
sympathy.... He never pronounced the sentence of death without
severe pain; in the first instance it was the occasion of anguish. 99
Justice Chipman also blended compassion with composure as he
presided over the court. He was "at all times, and under all
circumstances, equally cool, deliberate and patient," so that even
when confronted with the machinations of the "cunning" lawyer, he
never responded with anything approaching "severity. " 1°° And
however removed he remained from the passions and perversities of
the litigants and their counsel, he attended to the feelings of all
affected parties. Moreover, he had "a happy talent of adapting the
law to the justice of the case, so that it was seldom necessary to apply
to the equity side of the court."'10 1
The judge's "happy talent" was not inborn-it was the product of
a cultivated intellect. Brilliance and erudition were not prerequisites
for the office of the judge, but a "sagacity" developed through mental
98. Id.
99. Binney, supra note 29, at 19.
100. CHIPMAN, supra note 59, at 198, 199.
101. Id. at 197; see also BARTOL, supra note 77, at 7 ("[E]ngaged as he had been in politics,
with his whole heart espousing one side, on his becoming judge he put the politics entirely off,
and, in his place, knew no distinction of fellow or foe."). Though remaining outside the present
bounds of this paper, potentially fruitful connections might be drawn between the law/equity
distinction in legal thought and the justice/grace distinction in theology.
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discipline was a crucial component of judicial character. Others "may

have had more learning at immediate command," Binney allowed,
but "none have had their learning under better discipline" than

Justice Tilghman. 1°2 Likewise, Chipman's capacity for judgment was
clearly an acquired trait. Indeed, his exemplary "mental qualities and

habits" were chiefly attributed to his intensive exposure to "dead
languages." 10 3 His biographer once again referred to another
(unidentified) authority, who confirmed that this course of study
"'cultivates a habit of patience, of attention, of acuteness and
discrimination.' '' 10 With such a disciplined mind, the judge was
"shielded against prejudice in making his decisions .... He so clearly
discerned a difference between the right and wrong side of a cause...
that he seemed to lose sight of the parties, and everything

extraneous."'105 Chipman's biographer admitted that "a man of
ordinary powers of mind, if he be undisturbed by his passions" might
also function as a "useful and respectable judge" without succumbing
6
to such a regimen, but "he can never be a Mansfield or a Marshall."'

Chipman's

omission from this class

of judges is, however,

conspicuous. And one is left wondering what precisely constitutes the
source of Mansfield's or Marshall's greatness. 0 7
It would seem that Judge Chipman has been upstaged by
Mansfield and Marshall in his own biography. Yet Chipman's

tendency to blend in with the typeface is consistent with another
aspect of judicial character-artless simplicity. His biographer noted
that the young Chipman aspired to "become the oracle of law to the
state of Vermont" when he grew up-a vocation requiring no small
measure of selflessness."' 8 Indeed, the judges were rendered virtually
102. Binney, supra note 29, at 21; see also BARTOL, supra note 77, at 6-7 ("I do not demand
for him the credit of that gigantic force and weight of faculties by which, in some men, we are
amazed and overpowered .... ").
103. CHIPMAN, supra note 59, at 199
104. Id.
105. Id. at 199-200.
106. Id. at 200.
107. While a few biographers spoke of a more untutored faculty of judgment, it was almost
always one shaped and directed by learning. For more on the role of the mind in legal judgment,
from the perspective of antebellum lawyers, see MILLER, supra note 23, at 117-55 (discussing
lawyers' conception of "intellectual elegance"). I focus here primarily on rank-and-file rather
than exceptional American judges (in antebellum period this means Marshall; from time to time
this category expands to include Story and Kent). These exceptional judges will be considered in
greater depth in the Part III of this paper. My reason for deferring discussion of such judicial
greats is that the main biographical treatments of them were published in the post-bellum
period.
108. CHIPMAN, supra note 59, at 195.
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faceless in the biographers' portraits; they were uniformly "simple,"
"guileless," "child-like," and "unpretentious." And nowhere was the
judge's impersonality more noticeable than in his judgments. Of Chief
Justice Tilghman, Binney had this to say:
He asked ... for submission to no authority so rarely as to his own.
You may search his opinions in vain, for any thing like personal
assertion.... He spoke and wrote as the minister of reason,
claiming obedience to her, and selecting with scrupulous modesty
such language as, while it sustained the dignity of his office, kept
down from the relief, in which he might well have appeared, the
individual who filled it.... [T]here is not to be found one arrogant,
one supercilious expression, turned against the opinions of other
judges, one vain-glorious regard toward himself. He does not write
as if it occurred to him, that his writings would be examined to fix
his measure, when compared with the standard of great men, but as
if their exclusive use was to assist in fixing a standard of the law) 0 9
But as Binney's comments themselves suggest (and Shaw's statement
above confirmsll), written opinions were becoming the primary basis
for establishing judicial character. And, as the writings of a judge
were examined to "fix his measure," there was a growing appreciation
of individual style-as expressed through the written word.
B. Literary Manifestations of Judicial Character
The practice of committing judicial opinions to writing was not
common in the early national period. Only a few legislatures imposed
such requirements upon judges. Moreover, legal reporting systems
were relatively informal, in that courts typically had no salaried,
"official" reporters. Those volumes of decided cases that did become
available (their publication was often delayed) were expensive and
were marked by inaccuracies and omissions."l The reporter, who was
sometimes a judge himself, played a large role in the process: he
selected the cases that would be reported, stated the facts,
109. Binney, supra note 29, at 13.
110. See supra text accompanying note 62.
111. See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective
on Marshall CourtAscendancy, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1291, 1297-312 (1985); see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 322-26 (2d ed. 1985). A Pennsylvania attorney
complained of the reporting in his state:
Some of the volumes are hardly written in English. I am looking now at two of them in
my library ... which I will present to any one who can show me one page of correct
English from the hand of the reporter in the entire two volumes. From such reporting,
it is as impossible to obtain an intelligible statement of a case, as to procure it from a
chapter of the Koran.... A good judicial effort may be caricatured by a reporter, just
as a gentleman may be made a harlequin by his tailor.
PORTER, supra note 57, at 63.
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reconstructed arguments of counsel and opinions of judges (chiefly
from his own notes and recollections of the proceedings), and
provided annotations."' In some cases, the collaboration between
reporter and judge was quite close. James Kent's working relationship
with William Johnson provides a prominent and especially striking
example of a judge's reliance on his reporter. Writing to Johnson in
1815, Kent admitted: "'I am only afraid of reporting too much, and I
shall stand in need of your judgment on that point, seeing I am alone
in my Court and have no other aid, and I shall place more reliance on
your judgment than my own."'113 And upon retirement in 1823, he
wrote to Johnson: "'If my name is to live in judicial annals, it will be
11 4
in association with yours.'
Over the course of the antebellum period, written judicial
opinions became the norm in appellate courts, and official law
reporters gradually replaced private entrepreneurs. As early as 1839,
the American Jurist could proudly announce:
In almost all the United States, the decisions of the higher courts
are required by law to be reported, either by the judges ... or by a

reporter officially appointed and paid in part at least by the
government; they are distributed at the public expense, in the same
manner as the statute laws, besides being sold by the reporter on
his own account; and the opinions of the judges are for the most
part drawn up in writing. The reported cases are a series of
elaborate legal essays, on the various subjects to which they happen
to relate, drawn up with the knowledge and expectation that they
are to be published, and to become an authoritative exposition of
the law and its application. The decisions of our higher tribunals,
therefore, which are reported and published in pursuance of some
legislative provision, seem to be thereby invested with a sanction
and authority, which the English reports have never enjoyed since
the days of the year-books."t 5

112. See Langbein, supra note 74, at 576-77. According to Joyce, some reporters even relied
on the notes of other counsel when they could not be present for portions of the trial (and they
often took great liberties with these notes). On occasion, they were provided with the notes of
the judge himself. See Joyce, supra note 111, at 1296, 1304-06. Friedman has also emphasized the
individual reporters' role in determining the content of these volumes, insisting that they were
not simply "slavish accounts" of the judges' rulings: "Like the great English reports, they were
guidebooks for the practitioner. Some reporters added little essays on the law to the oral and
written courtroom materials they collected." FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 324; see id. at 32233.
113. Letter from James Kent to William Johnson (Apr. 8, 1815), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
KENT (Library of Congress, Archival Manuscript Material), quoted in Langbein, supra note 74,
at 582 n.167.
114. Letter from James Kent to William Johnson (Apr. 29, 1823), in 5 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES KENT, supra note 113, quoted in Langbein, supra note 74, at 583.
115. American Reports and Reporter,22 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 108, 108 (1839).
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Gradually, legal reporting became so standardized that George

Caines (an officially appointed reporter for the New York Supreme
Court) could speak of his "exertions" as "reduced to little more than

arranging the materials received, and giving, in a summary manner,
the arguments adduced. 11 6 The reporter was relegated to a subsidiary
role in the production process, and written opinions were increasingly
ascribed to individual judges. "7 The status of a legal report as an
authoritative statement of the law came to depend, in large part, upon
the accuracy with which the reporter reproduced the words of the
judge.11 8 Thus, while the legislature may have invested these legal

reports with "a sanction and authority," the judges themselves were
increasingly regarded as legal authorities in their own right-albeit of
various degrees of stature and reliability." 9
It is important to note, however, that judicial writers were not

openly lauded for creativity in their compositions. 120 After all, they
were effectively compelled by law to commit their judgments to
words, and one of the motivations behind the law was to cabin

judicial discretion.12 1 Moreover, the conventions of opinion writing
dictated that the judge speak for "the court"-which may have
116. FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 325. From Kent's perspective, however, Caines was
simply incompetent. See Langbein, supra note 74, at 575. Additional evidence of the constraints
upon official reporters can be found in a review of William Rice's South Carolina Reporter in
the American Jurist: "The reporter explains the duties of his office, as prescribed by law, very
fully in his preface. He is required to publish the decisions only, and not the arguments of
counsel; and the decisions are to be selected by the judges." CriticalNotice, 22 AM. JURIST & L.
MAG. 488, 489 (1840) (reviewing 1 WILLIAM RICE, REPORTS OF CASES AT LAW, ARGUED AND
DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND COURT OF ERRORS OF SOUTH CAROLINA

(Charleston, Burges & James 1839)).
117. Arguments of counsel were now often excluded from the reports-largely due to space
considerations. In Ohio, there was legislation prohibiting publication of arguments "unless
specially directed by the Court." The editors of the American Juristviewed it as problematic to
exclude such arguments in all cases, because it "secures the court from responsibility, a privilege
of which judges, by the inherent indolence of human nature, may be too strongly tempted to
avail themselves, by throwing difficulties and objections into the shade instead of overcoming
them, and slurring over arguments instead of answering them." Ohio Condensed Reports, 10
AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 468, 469-70 (1833) (book review).
118. It should be noted that throughout this period there continued to be official reporters
who were judges themselves (reporting their own as well as their colleagues' opinions). But
even when not reporting themselves, judges exercised increasing control over which cases were
published. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 136.
119. Indeed, as Friedman observes: "Big states and famous judges were considered more
authoritative, and were cited more frequently than small states and small judges." FRIEDMAN,
supra note 111, at 325.
120. For a comparative perspective-pointing to the very different attitudes toward statutes
and the written output of judges in the legal cultures of nineteenth-century France and
Germany-see JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 374-502 (1968).
121. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 324 (publication of law reports viewed as essential to
a ".government of laws,"' tending to limit judicial discretion) (quoting William Cranch).
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consisted of a panel of judges-thus obscuring the identity of the
individual writer. 122 Ample documentation of the legal profession's
ambivalence towards the judicial writer may be found in antebellum
legal journals. 123 Judges were rarely referred to as "authors"; this

appellation was typically used only in connection with their extrajudicial commentaries and treatises. And even as attention was
directed towards the stylistic features of an opinion, they were
considered largely ornamental-dressing up the "reasons and

grounds" upon which the judgment was based.1 24 The writing of an
opinion was conceived as an act of interpretation or construction
rather than one of creation. According to Frances Lieber, a leading
expositor of legal hermeneutics, the judge was to divine the "true

sense" of the law-refraining from "bringing a sense into the words
... acknowledging, as [his] sole legitimate office, that of bringing the

sense out of them."125
Antebellum legal professionals were nonetheless inclined to

draw connections between a judge and his work. For instance,
Professor Simon Greenleaf instructed his students to attend to "[t]he
manner of the decision" as well as "the reasons on which it is
professedly founded.' 1 26 The decision, he explained, "may receive
some coloring and impress, from the position of the judges, their
political principles, and their habits of life, their physical
' 27
temperament, their intellectual, moral and religious character.'
122. Of course, dissenting opinions did not obscure the identity of the author and were
offered from a first-person perspective. And even judges who professed to be giving the opinion
of "the court" sometimes spoke in the first person-often to distinguish their personal views
from the ruling itself.
123. Initially, these periodicals devoted significant space to case reports and digests of
statutes. However the growth of legal reporting put most periodicals out of business; surviving
journals tended to reprint only "key decisions and other primary sources of law." FRIEDMAN,
supra note 111, at 329.
124. Digests of Recent Decisions, 7 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 344, 344 n.1 (1832).
125. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF
INTERPRETATION

AND

CONSTRUCTION

IN

LAW

AND

POLITICS,

WITH REMARKS

ON

PRECEDENTS AND AUTHORITIES 87 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839). Legal
and political interpretation were distinguished from "theological hermeneutics" in that the
Bible was amenable to "typical, allegorical, parabolical, analogical, moral and accommodatory
senses, and of corresponding modes of interpretation." By contrast, "[in politics and law we
have to deal with plain words and human use of them only." LIEBER, supra, at 76. See generally
James Farr, The Americanization of Hermeneutics: Francis Lieber's Legal and Political
Hermeneutics, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 83 (Gregory
Leyh ed., 1992) (demonstrating widespread influence of Lieber's work in nineteenth-century
America). For a discussion of biblical criticism in nineteenth century America, see JERRY
WAYNE BROWN, THE RISE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM IN AMERICA, 1800-1870 (1969).
126. LIEBER, supra note 125, at 230 (quoting Simon Greenleaf).
127. Id.
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This was not to say that "the decision will depend on these; but only
that they are considerations not to be wholly disregarded in perusing
and weighing the judgment delivered.' ' 2 "Thus," he concluded,
we should hardly expect to find any gratuitous presumption in
favor of innocence, or any leanings in mitiori censu, in the blood
thirsty and infamous Jeffries; nor could we, while reading and
considering their legal opinions, forget either the low breeding and
meanness of Saunders, the ardent temperament of Buller, the
dissolute habits, ferocity and profaneness of Thurlow; or the
intellectual greatness and integrity of Hobart, the sublimated piety
and enlightened conscience of Hale, the originality and genius of
Holt, the elegant manners and varied learning of Mansfield, or the
lofty tone of morals, and vast
conservative principles, the
29
comprehension of Marshall.1
Similarly, Lieber stressed the importance of assessing the "moral,
mental and political character" of the judge "who is claimed as having
established the authority." 130 In order to determine the weight of
judicial opinion, Lieber argued, it was necessary to take a full
measure of the judge's knowledge of the subject, the time in which he
lived, his motivations, and the authorities he brought to bear on the
131
litigated matter.
Articles in legal periodicals also drew connections between
judicial character and legal authority in their analyses of the judges'
literary output. For instance, an 1834 piece in the American Jurist,
entitled Characters of Law Books and Judges, evaluated individual
judges as well as legal publications.13 2 Alongside abbreviated reviews
of various treatises, reports and digests, we find entries such as this:
Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor.'The present wise and rational system
of English equity jurisprudence, owes more to him than perhaps to
any of his predecessors. There is no judge in the juridical annals of
England, whose judicial character has received greater and more
constant homage. His knowledge of the law, said Lord Kenyon, (7
Term. R. 416) was most extraordinary and he was a consummate
master of the profession. His decisions at this day, and in our
courts, do undoubtedly carry with them a more commanding
weight of authority than those of any other judge.' 1 Kent Com.
494.133

and this:
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
See id.
See Charactersof Law Books and Judges, 12 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 5 (1834).
Id. at 37.
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Jeffries, Lord Chancellor. 'No sentiment of integrity, no feeling of
mercy ever found a place in his bosom. He had a brutal levity of
conduct, strangely unbecoming the judicial character. His
acquirements as a lawyer were of a mean order; and it is not
dealing too harshly with him to adopt the censure of Mr. Justice
Foster, and to pronounce him the very worst judge that ever
disgraced Westminster Hall.' Roscoe's Lives, 134.134
And there were even a few American entries, such as this:
Mckean, ChiefJustice. 'He was the most learned and distinguished
lawyer of his time, and who, in the language of his successor, could
not be supposed to have favored constructions unfriendly to true
liberty or unwarranted by the genuine sense of the constitution.'
Per Meredith, arguendo, Judge Peck's Trial, 338.
'A learned lawyer of the old school.' 1 Kent Com. 512.135
and this:
Story, Justice. 'This eminent judge never handles a question on any
part of the science of law, without examining it in all its relations,
with equal candor and freedom and fervor and force, and leaving it
completely exhausted.' 4 Kent Com. 489.136
Thus it can be seen that the critical analysis of judicial opinions was
implicitly premised upon a view of the judge as author. In evaluating
the authority of a judicial opinion, antebellum legal professionals
clearly took the identity of its author into consideration. But what was
it that authorized the judicial author? The source of his authority had
initially been derived from his "judicial character." Yet as discussions
of "judicial character" came to incorporate the written work of the
judge, attention was drawn to the ways in which the text of an opinion
reflected his temperament and biases as well. Increasingly, "judicial
character" came to refer to the peculiar qualities of an individual
judge instead of an abstract set of attributes possessed by the
exemplary judge. By what standard, then, was the work of the judicial
author to be judged? The resulting tension between authorship and
authority necessitated a revision of the relationship between a judge
and his work.
134. Id. at 39.
135. Id. at 45.
136. Id. at 59. Immediately following this entry, there is another one, considering the
character of Story's treatise:
Story's Bailments. 'This excellent treatise is the most learned and most complete of any
that we have on the doctrine of bailment. It aims to lay down all the principles
appertaining to the subject, both in the civil, the foreign, the English, and the
American law, with entire accuracy; and I beg leave to say, after a thorough
examination of the work, that, in my humble judgment, it has succeeded to an eminent
degree.' 2 Kent. Com. 611.
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This revisionary process can be traced through the biographical
literature of the antebellum period. Initial constructions of the
judicial author tended to downplay the degree of literary invention
involved. For instance, the biographer of Judge Trimble emphasized
the labored quality of judgments: "[N]o man could bestow more
thought, more caution, more candor, or more research upon any legal
investigation than he did. ' 137 His judgments were admired for their
"clearness, strength, vigor of reasoning, and exactness of conclusion.
Without being eloquent in manner, they had the full effect of the best
eloquence. They were persuasive and overwhelming in their
influence. ' 138 The convincing opinion was crafted with common sense,
as exemplified in the works of Bushrod Washington:
He indulged not the rash desire to fashion the law to his own views;
but to follow out its precepts with a sincere good faith and
simplicity. Hence he possessed the happy faculty of yielding just the
proper weight to authority, neither on the one hand surrendering
himself blindfold to the dictates of other judges, nor on the other
hand overruling 39settled doctrines upon his own private notion of
policy or justice.
In its initial form, the ideal judge-writer was figured as one who
allowed the law to speak through him. What was said of William
Tilghman was typical: "[T]he character of his mind ... shines forth in
his judgments . .o140 This was not, however, to imply that Judge
Tilghman's judgments were impositions of his personal views of the
law. To the contrary:
The first great property which they disclose, is his veneration of the
law, and above all, of the fundamental Common Law. There is not
a line from his pen, that trifles with the sacred deposit in his hands,
by claiming to fashion it according to a private opinion of what it
I should rather say,
ought to be. Judicial legislation he abhorred,
141
dreaded,as an implication of his conscience.
Here was the epitome of the neoclassical craftsman: "he was master
of a body of rules, preserved and handed down to him ... for
manipulating traditional materials in order to achieve the effects
prescribed by the cultivated audience ... to which he owed both his
'142
livelihood and social status.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Memoir of Judge Trimble, supra note 81, at 156.
Id.
Obituary Notice of the Hon. Bushrod Washington, supra note 78, at 157.

JOHN GOLDER, LIFE OF THE HONOURABLE WILLIAM TILGHMAN, LATE CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 33 (Philadelphia, Thomas Town 1829).

141. Id. at 33-34.
142. Woodmansee, supra note 38, at 426.
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Toward mid-century, however, one may detect hints of a more
romantic conception of judging in the biographical literature.143 That
is, the creativity of the judge is praised-albeit cautiously-and his
opinions are more likely to be regarded as emanations from his own
mind, described through use of organic metaphors. William Porter's
"extended tribute" to the "genius" of John Bannister Gibson
(Tilghman's successor as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court) provides an especially striking example of this development.
While the formal features of this work, entitled An Essay on the Life,
Character and Writings of John B. Gibson, LL.D. (1855), do not
distinguish it from the preceding publications, two other characteristics set it apart. First, the biographer expressly differentiates his task
from that of the eulogists, who paid their respects on the occasion of
Gibson's death. Sufficient time has passed, he avers, to "enable us to
pronounce with less partiality on the qualities which have challenged
our applause."' 144 And second, Porter refers to Gibson as the "author"
of his opinions, and devotes over half of the biography to a discussion
of these writings "for the purpose of illustrating his judicial
character. '145 Porter acknowledges the "hazard of such an attempt,"
viewing it as similar to "undertaking to exhibit the genius of a
sculptor, by means of an arm separated from its trunk, or of a painter,
by a handful snatched from the canvass.' 1 46 With this apology, he
proceeds in his analysis of Gibson's work, commenting on those cases
notable for "the nature of the subject, the mode of its discussion, or
47
the peculiarities of the writer which they display.',
This presentation of Gibson's written "productions" is designed
148
to illustrate "[t]he gradual and uniform progress of his mind.'
Porter contrasts the judge's early opinions, which were "natural and
pure," with his later, more mature ones, marked by "conciseness and

143. This observation is not meant to imply that the shift to a romantic mentality was a
sharp or decisive one. For as Peter Gay observes, "[t]he notion that romanticism might be
defined by pitting it against classicism was born in the romantic era ..." 4 GAY, supra note 18,
at 41. Throughout the nineteenth century one finds evidence of the continuing influence of the
classical ideal-sometimes voiced by those most readily identified with "the Romantic School."
For instance, Gay notes, "Goethe, of all people, once famously defined the romantic as sick and
the classical as healthy, but for much of the time, he wrote like a romantic and served German
romantics as a much admired exemplar." Id. As will be seen below, the romantic does not
completely displace the neoclassical judicial ideal in the latter half of the century.
144. PORTER, supra note 57, at 9.
145. Id. at 62.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 63.
148. Id. at 51.
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force. '149 The volatility of Gibson's judicial temperament can be
inferred from these texts; early cases suggest the "impulsiveness" of
the young judge, and even later ones show that Gibson might still be
roused to "indignation" in the face of procedural improprieties.110 As
Porter surveys the body of Gibson's judicial opinions, he is struck by
' He cites numerous
the "power of his pen" and his "legal ingenuity." 51
decisions in which the judge "boldly" establishes new and influential
doctrines and "foreshadows" changes in popular sentiment.15 2 And
even when opinions seem to defy popular will (not to mention legal
precedent), they can be admired as acts of heroism. The judge was
especially impressive in a suit involving controversial questions of
land law: "Stung by the action of the legislature, and roused by this
new onset, he deals the blows about him, on all sides, with a force so
irresistible, and bears himself throughout with a bravery so
admirable ....
,,153
His judicial deportment was most impressive,
however, during the turbulent 1830s and 1840s, when Philadelphia
became the "city of riots.1 15 4 Faced with conflicting legal claims in the
aftermath of this disturbance, Gibson pursued a "manly and patriotic
course," effectively replacing the "dominion of violence" with the
' 55
"dominion of law."'
In addition to this chronicle of noteworthy cases, Porter also
provides a glimpse into the judge's "manner of reaching his
conclusions, and writing his opinions.' 15 6 Generally speaking, Gibson
exhibited a "disinclination to be guided even by the lights which his
own Court had set up, and ...a predisposition to illuminate his path
by the sparks struck out for the occasion by his own
understanding."' 57 He avoided extensive consultations with other
members of the bench, "communicating his views ... in short
detached sentences, sometimes not at all, but when he did, hitting the
exact point, and diffusing additional light on the principles in
question."1 8 When appointed to deliver the opinion of the court, he
149. Id. at 64, 98. Porter vividly depicts this contrast as "like the sinews of a growing lad
compared to the well-knit muscles of a man." Id. at 51.
150. See id. at 47, 72-73.
151. Id. at 74, 75.
152. See id. at 65-96.
153. Id. at 75.
154. Id. at 89.
155. Id. at 91.
156. Id. at 107.
157. Id. at 99.
158. Id. at 107.
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conducted a cursory examination of the authorities, tending to "think
chiefly without the aid of his pen, and out of the reach of books." '59
He might have been found "in his chamber, on the street, at the table,
sometimes, it is feared, on the bench during the progress of other
causes" as he deliberated, and "[p]ersons who approached him on
these occasions, were struck with, and sometimes offended at, his
abstracted and careless air."'16 Unlike the neoclassical judges
1 61
discussed above, Gibson's "rich, powerful, and even graceful"
opinions were not the product of labored craftsmanship. They were
written only after "the very sentences were formed in his mind, and
when he assumed the pen, he rarely laid it aside until the opinion had
been completed. ' 162 No mere manipulator of traditional materials,
Gibson "breathed out his great thoughts with the conscious freedom
of a man who is master of the very ground which he occupies."1 63 Yet
even though these organic metaphors dominate Porter's narrative, he
does not embrace the ideal of the romantic judge completely; he also
finds occasion to speak of the mind of the judge as a great
"machine."' 164 All the same, it would seem that Porter's Judge Gibson
was transgressing the boundaries of judicial character, displaying the
unmistakable signs of genius.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

107-08.
110.
108.
100.
99, 136.
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III. THE GENIUS OF THE JUDGE, 1850-1900
A speculative, inventive, imaginative judge is a paradox. No one
can reasonably ask what a judge has invented or devised, or even
discovered. His duty and his praise are in the faithful
administration of a system created to his hands; a system of
principles, the just development of which affords sufficient scope
for genius, without destroying what is established, or innovating in
the spirit of a law giver. If ever his labours approach the merit of
discovery, it is when he reforms or brings to light what had a
previous existence, but had been perverted or obscured.
-Horace Binney 65
The vast and intricate system of common-law jurisprudence, with
its comprehensive doctrines, its nice shades, subtle distinctions, and
unlimited application, has been from time immemorial a fertile
field of fame.... It is there that ambition may revel among the
most gorgeous pictures of glory; where genius can find an unlimited
scope for the exercise of its utmost powers ... where so many
footprints lead to the summit .... Nor are these confined to the
steps of the Inner Temple, or to England's soil, but up the same
pathway, and to a no less degree of eminence, ascend our
Marshalls, Storys, Taneys, Kents, Hemphills, Robertses ....
166
-James D. Lynch
The "genius" of the judge was celebrated by legal biographers
throughout the nineteenth century. Even Horace Binney, who
strenuously denied the creativity of the judge, acknowledged the role
of genius in the administration of the common law. And the first
chapter of James D. Lynch's The Bench and Bar of Texas is entirely
concerned with the source and manifestations of genius within as well
as outside the field of law. The use of this word, it is submitted, is not
trivial, and it suggests that the influence of romanticism penetrated
farther into nineteenth-century American legal culture than has been
appreciated. Perry Miller long ago contended that the antebellum
"legal mentality" evolved in opposition to a romantic temperament;
lawyers "stood for the Head against the Heart.' 1 67 He read the legal
literature of the period as consciously aiming to oppose "the cold
circumspection of legal rationality to the fantastic exercises of
165. Binney, supra note 29, at 14.
166. JAMES D. LYNCH, THE BENCH AND BAR OF TEXAS 18 (St. Louis, Nixon-Jones Printing

Co. 1885).
167. MILLER, supra note 23, at 120-21.
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romantic genius," and maintained that "in neither their theoretical
statements or their eulogies of each other are the lawyers disposed to
salute 'genius' in the law."'1 68 Robert Ferguson reaches similar

conclusions in his more recent examination of the impact of
romanticism on the American "legal mind.' 1 69 A crucial aspect of the

transition from neoclassicism to romanticism, he explains, was the
emergence of a new way of regarding the self. Whereas neoclassicism
"assumed an identity that reached through civic action toward the
presumed identity of other men and women," romanticism was
"concerned more with ego and self-expression" and it required "a
prior discovery and assertion of personal identity.' 1 70 Ferguson
maintains that antebellum lawyers generally perceived romanticism

as a threat to their craft and retreated into a narrow professionalism.171 Accordingly, by mid-century, "the attorney's skill and the

writer's creativity appeared a contradiction in terms.' 17 2 Such
historical accounts leave no place for the biographies of Judge Gibson

and his colleagues on the bench.
What then, should be made of the recurrent references to the

"genius" of the judge-particularly by mid-century-in American
legal literature? As an initial matter, it is important to attend to

changes in connotations of the word itself over time. While in its
original Latin sense "genius" meant "a guardian spirit," by the

sixteenth century it had come to refer to the "characteristic
disposition or quality" of an individual man. 73 The appearance of the
modern meaning of "extraordinary ability" dates from the mid16& Id. at 138, 149. Miller incorrectly states that Justice Story never used the word "genius"
in connection with Marshall. In fact, in the very eulogy he cites in The Life of the Mind, Story
referred to Marshall's "transcendent genius." See Joseph Story, Eulogy on Chief Justice
Marshall, 14 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 448, 454 (1835). Story also paid tribute to Marshall's
"genius" (as well as his learning and virtues) in a speech at the opening of the Supreme Court.
See 2 WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 203 (Boston, Charles C. Little
& James Brown 1851) [hereinafter LIFE AND LETYERS OF STORY].
169. See FERGUSON, supra note 24, at 30.
170. Id. at 248-49.
171. The South constitutes an exception for Ferguson, for he notes the "continuing
ascendancy of the lawyer-writer" on the eve of the Civil War in this region. "In trying to
reconcile slavery, dueling, and the rule of law in a republic," Ferguson observes, "the southern
lawyer embodied the contradictions of his culture. His predicament, in fact, led him to look to
the intellectual comprehensiveness of the eighteenth-century bar and away from the growing
precision of the nineteenth-century expert." Id. at 292, 295.
172. Id. at 287. Karsten comes to a different conclusion in Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made
Law in Nineteenth-Century America, arguing that Judeo-Christian values sometimes led
nineteenth-century judges to practice a "Jurisprudence of the Heart." Curiously, however, he
does not consider the influence of romanticism in his discussion. See KARSTEN, supra note 15, at
4-8, 147-291, 312-24.
173. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 143.
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eighteenth century, and it was "originally connected with the idea of
'1 4
'spirit' through the notion of 'inspiration. "11
However in the
nineteenth century, it was increasingly associated with "creative"
power, in the sense of "human making and innovation.' 75 Literary
critics of this period distinguished works of genius from those of
"talent." Works of the latter sort were viewed as mechanical
productions of the "lower faculties of fancy, 'understanding,' and
empirical 'choice." ' 176 By contrast, works of genius were described in
organic terms and were understood to originate in the "higher
faculties of imagination, 'reason,' and the 'will.""' 77 As M.H. Abrams
summarizes: "[T]alent has 'the faculty of appropriating and applying
the knowledge of others,' but not 'the creative, and self-sufficing
power of absolute Genius. 1 78 It should be emphasized that "genius"
could be used to describe not only a characteristic of a work, but also
a capacity and the personification of that capacity. Indeed, Coleridge
uses all three in the space of a single paragraph, defining a work of
''genius" as one in which the power of "genius" -"acting creatively
under laws of its own origination" -is manifest. 79 He then offers up
Shakespeare, "himself a nature humanized," as the embodiment of
genius, insofar as he constitutes "a genial understanding directing
self-consciously a power and an implicit wisdom deeper than
consciousness.'1 80
Given the meanings attached to "genius" within this critical
tradition, its presence in nineteenth-century legal discourse requires
explanation. Did the legal writer mean to imply the judge was "acting
creatively under laws of his own origination"? Determining the
import of "genius" in this context is difficult, because judicial
biographers were not particularly self-conscious in their use of the
word. Moreover, the orientation of biographers towards "genius"
changed over the course of the century. The "genius" Horace Binney
describes in 1827 is not precisely the one James Lynch celebrates in
1885. For Binney, the judicial office unquestionably requires
individuals with "the noblest faculties of the mind.' 181 He insists that
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
See id. at 82-84.
ABRAMS, supra note 17, at 176.
Id.
Id. (quoting S.T. COLERIDGE,

BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA: OR BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCHES OF My LITERARY LIFE AND OPINIONS 31 (London, Rest Fenner 1817)).

179. Id. at 225 (quoting Samuel Taylor Coleridge).
180. Id. (quoting Coleridge).
181. Binney, supra note 29, at 7.
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few of the judges' duties are "mechanical.... There is no routine by
which their business is performed without the expenditure of
thought. ' 182 Indeed, his judicial ideal requires men of extraordinary
ability: "For them are reserved those gordian knots which, although
others may cut, they must at least appear to untie."' 183 Yet the genius
of Binney's judge is manifest chiefly in acts of reformation or
recovery of that which has been "perverted or obscured. 184 Other
sciences-such as mathematics, physics, and politics-allow such
"freedom and expansiveness.., that even imagination may be invited
to attend upon genius as it explores them ... [so] that the personal
character of the individual becomes the pervading soul of the work,
and looks out from every part of it."185 But the science of the common
law was not one "in which the mind of a judge might speculate
without impediment," nor would it be appropriate to inquire as to
"what new principles he has added to the code, or what new
1 86
combinations he had made to increase its vigour.'
By contrast, Lynch maintains that it is in law more than any of
the other "schools of science" that genius finds "an unlimited scope
for the exercise of its utmost powers.' ' 87 He calls to mind the names
of Coke, Harwicke, Mansfield, Eldon, and joins with them the names
of Marshall, Story, Taney, Kent, Hemphill, and Roberts, proclaiming
that such men have "erected their monuments of eternal glory" in the
form of "comprehensive doctrines" and "brilliant precedents of
eminence ... which have afforded marks and models for the
aspiration of every country."' 88 In his biographical sketch of John
Hemphill, Lynch provides the most explicit formulation of his notion
of the judge as genius. He begins by observing that "[t]he professional
minds of judges and lawyers may be divided into two separate and
distinct classes, which may be aptly designated, respectively, the
perceptive and the memorative."' 189 Those in the latter class "depend
upon memory, and are subservient to a vague medley of general
precedents and authorities which must be invoked on all occasions
when it becomes necessary to grapple with great and important

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 13.
LYNCH, supra note 166, at 16, 18.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 69.
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questions." 19° Their "powers of perception have never been whetted
by close and continued application" and they "are deficient in the
organs of analysis and abstraction.""19 By contrast, the "perceptive"
class "comprises those who depend chiefly upon their own conscious
resources, who combine and embody the principles of law with their
own perceptions, and mingle them with the elements of their own
judgment."19 While the "judgment and discernment" of the first class
"are habitual plagiarisms," Lynch observes, those of the second class
"are the emanation of their own minds, and they speak as authorities
themselves.' 193
The ascriptions of "genius" to the judge in the biographies
published from 1850 to 1900 must be considered in light of more
general developments in the genre. Works published in the second
half of the century were less didactic in tone, evincing a more critical,
historical orientation. Their authors tended to focus their investigations inward, seeking to uncover "the private springs" of the judge's
public actions. 194 Though they endeavored to portray a person rather
than a "Statue," these biographers still tended to idealize their
subjects. 195 The exemplary judicial figure of the mid-nineteenth
century embodied the tension between "the attorney's skill and the
writer's.creativity."' 96 However, post-bellum biographies more openly
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. Lynch goes on to describe Hemphill in glowing terms, comparing him favorably
with the likes of Marshall, Hardwicke, and Mansfield. Hemphill was effectively the John
Marshall of Texas: "His long career upon the bench is characterized by an untiring and
successful effort to harmonize the excerpted elements of Texas jurisprudence and endow it with
an efficiency that could traverse the scope of justice." Id. Moreover, he shared with Hardwicke
"an intuitive perception of the law." Id. at 70. And, although he displayed a generous nature to
his friends and family, "so eminent was his judicial character" that he, like Mansfield, would be
"'remembered only with the impression of the awful form and figure of justice.".' Id. at 72
(quoting Erskine speaking of Lord Mansfield).
194. See PHILIP SLAUGHTER, A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM GREEN, LL.D.:
JURIST AND SCHOLAR, WITH SOME PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF HiM 9 (Richmond, Wm.

Ellis Jones 1883). For example, the author of a biography of Roger Minott Sherman
acknowledges in a prefatory note the existence of a "very able sketch" of the jurist from 1846
and explains that his own work has been occasioned by the unearthing of new documents
(mostly private letters) bearing on the subject's life-documents which shed light on the
"individuality of the great Connecticut lawyer." WILLIAM A. BEERS, A BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH OF ROGER MINOTr SHERMAN, THE EMINENT CONNECTICUT JURIST, 1773-1845, at 2
(Bridgeport, J.J. Coggswell 1882). For a general discussion of these developments in the genre
of biography as a whole, see CASPER, supra note 35, at 202-56.
195. SLAUGHTER, supra note 194, at 7. It is important to add, however, that not all
biographers were so reverential in tone. See, e.g., JOSEPH G. BALDWIN, THE FLUSH TIMES OF
ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI: A SERIES OF SKETCHES (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1853).
196. FERGUSON, supra note 24, at 287.
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acknowledged the creative role of the judge in the formation and

reformation of the law. The "genius" of the judge was, nonetheless,
tempered by the strength of his "character"-now meant to refer to

the internal consistency of the self rather than the submission of the
self to an external standard. By the end of the century, a new judicial
ideal had crystallized in the literature: the independent judge. Neither

egoist nor iconoclast, this judicial hero was the human incarnation of
the rule of law the people had given to themselves.

The reconception of character in judicial biography was in line
with a more general shift in attitudes towards the self in post-bellum
American culture. As noted above, the antebellum character ideal
had stressed self-control and self-sacrifice for the sake of higher ideals

of duty, honor, and integrity, aiming to contain the centrifugal forces
unleashed by political revolution, religious revivalism, and market

expansion. This vision of the self was, however, less serviceable by the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, as Americans grew increasingly
conscious of living within the confines of a routinized, industrial
culture. The "overriding threat" in this period was not an "unbridled
individualism of the spirit" but rather a "dessicated formalism that
banished feeling and emotion."' 97 Cultural historians have suggested

that this sense of constriction led to the formulation of an alternative

"personality ideal"-one which "preached the development of a
higher self ... [which] became its own higher law"-a vision of
selfhood which was dynamic and open-ended. 198 Ultimately, this
romantic ideal worked to subtly transform rather than wholly displace

the character ideal, reflecting the growing conviction that "character
could be sustained in the modern era only by the cultivation and
99
spread of personality."1
197. Fox, supra note 19, at 648-49.
198. Id. at 647.
199. Id. at 649. In speaking of the character and personality ideals as intertwined in the
period from 1875 to 1925, Fox explicitly departs from the view taken by Warren Susman in
"Personality"and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture. See Susman, supra note 63, at 216
(positing a "radical shift" from a culture of character to one of personality in the first decade of
the twentieth century). Fox insists that there was "no simple linear movement ... from
character to personality," presenting evidence of the extent to which liberals in the decades
surrounding 1900 were endeavoring to "construct a single ideal out of both." Fox, supra note 19,
at 647, 648; see also HILKEY, supra note 35, at 127 (noting persistence of the character ideal well
into the twentieth century, though subtly altered in order "to meet the challenges of modem
circumstances"). The evidence presented in this article provides further support for Fox's
revision of Susman. For other works describing the breakdown of the antebellum ideal of
character, see JOHN G. CAWELTI, APOSTLES OF THE SELF-MADE MAN (1965) (noting shift in
literature of self-help from ascetic moralism to promotion of willpower, initiative, personal
magnetism, and a relish for competitive struggle); Park, supra note 67, at 17 (observing that late
nineteenth-century literature portrayed a man of "character" as one who "made his mark on the
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The emergence of a romantic judicial ideal might, nonetheless,
seem curious in a period commonly associated with the "rise of legal
formalism."2 °° According to Karl Llewellyn, post-bellum judges were
deeply influenced by Langdellian legal "science," and their work
conformed to a "Formal Style." Members of the judiciary, he argues,
shared a common outlook: "[R]ules of law are to decide the cases;
policy is for the legislature, not for the courts, and so is change even
in pure common law. '20' Moreover, their opinions were marked by a
rigid, deductive mode of reasoning from "Principle"; judgments were
rendered "with an air or expression of single-line inevitability."2 2 This
judicial style, Llewellyn observes, tended to "drive conscious creation
all but underground, make change and growth things to be ignored in
opinions, and to be concealed not only from a public but from a
self. ' 203 To be sure, his description must be taken as something of a
caricature; more recent scholarship has shown that judicial decisions
in this era were "suffused with the rhetoric of arguments from
convenience and policy. '2°4 Yet even if the Llewellyn's discussion of
the "Formal Style" overstates the point, it is nonetheless clear that
Langdell and his fellows exerted a strong influence over post-bellum
legal thought and practice. 205 How, then, can their characterization of
the act of judging as a "discovery" of principles immanent in decided
cases be squared with the biographers' portraits of judicial genius?
What accounts for the contemporaneous appearance of the
Langdellian scientific explorer and the romantic judge-at least at the
world"); E. Anthony Rotundo, Body and Soul: Changing Ideals of American Middle-Class
Manhood, 1770-1920, J. SOC. HIST., Summer 1983, at 23, 23 (1983) (documenting shift from
masculine ideal "rooted in the life of the community and the qualities of a man's soul" to one
"based on individual achievement and the male body"); and id. at 28-29, 33.
200. See TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 13, at 253-66; TRANSFORMATION II, supra note
13, at 9-31; see also GILMORE, supra note 13; LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 38-41.
201. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 38.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 40.
204. The Elusive Transformation,supra note 15, at 156; see also PURCELL, supra note 15, at
396 n.15; Scheiber, supra note 15, at 12-18.
205. As Thomas Grey has observed:
Langdell and his followers took the view of law as science seriously and carried it out
programmatically in a way that had no precedent in the common law world, erecting a
vast discursive structure that came to dominate legal education and to greatly influence
the practical work of lawyers and judges.
Langdell's Orthodoxy, supra note 15, at 5; see also WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 79-109 (1994); cf.
Robert W. Gordon, The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1244 (1995)
(suggesting that the chief effect of Langdell's work was in the realm of legal education and that
its effects on practice were "long-term, diffuse, and indirect," gradually soaking "into the
marrow of lawyers' bones").
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level of legal discourse?
While a complete answer would require a fuller examination of
the relationship between romanticism and legal formalism, several
observations may be made here. First, it should be noted that the
romantic judges portrayed in legal literature were generally those of
previous generations.2 °6 And their biographies were penned at a time
when the typical judge faced a large number of "cut-and-dried" cases,
often finding himself relegated to an administrative role-monitoring
a system of "assembly-line justice."2 07 In a sense, then, the images of

the romantic judge may be viewed as expressions of nostalgia for a
"golden age" before the law was settled and the judicial process
became a matter of routine. 20 8 But there was also a considerable

amount of judicial activism on the public law front, especially towards
the end of the century, with courts subjecting state regulatory statutes
to a heightened level of scrutiny. 2 9 Legal professionals anxious to

legitimate these decisions may have been inclined to present them as
the products of legal science or romantic vision.' 0 In the final analysis,
these conflicting images may simply reflect the competing demands
placed upon the post-bellum judge.2 1' In an era of unprecedented
206. This tendency to celebrate judges of a bygone age might also be linked to the Victorian
practice of "hero-worship." As Walter Houghton has observed, the heroic figure proved
consoling in an era "when the Bible and the Church were no longer able to satisfy the religious
instinct of many Victorians" and attractive to those plagued with "the sense of being small and
inconsequential, caught in the iron grip of huge social or physical forces, with one's potential
greatness thwarted and dammed up." WALTER E. HOUGHTON, THE VICTORIAN FRAME OF
MIND, 1830-1870, at 316, 336 (1957).
207. FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 389, 390. On the consequences of the increase in the
caseload of courts in this period, see id. at 384-90 ("The great volume of cases could only be
handled through radical routinization." Id. at 389.).
208. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 381. In using this phrase, Friedman implies such a
era actually existed. He goes on to consider what it was about the "golden age" that made it
golden: "The great judges-Lemuel Shaw, John Bannister Gibson, John Marshall-were
builders of institutions and molders of doctrine; moreover, they had style." Id. Those were the
days, he maintains, when judges "invented whole areas of law in a few majestic brush-stokes."
Id. at 384. As has been shown above, see supra text accompanying notes 77-110, antebellum
biographers did not speak of these judges in this way. It was only with the post-bellum
biographers that one finds such characterizations of their careers. It should also be noted that
Friedman seems to echo Progressive critics in speaking of the formalism of post-bellum judges
as "a way of disguising thought." FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 384.
209. See id. at 343-45. See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND
THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960).
210. That is, they might both be seen as examples of the "fresh myths and disguises" legal
professionals in this period "invented ... to protect their roles." FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at
341.
211. The dual tendencies towards romanticism and bureaucratization in this period have
been well-documented. See, e.g., RABINOWITZ, supra note 19, at 238 (arguing that "technical"
and "subjective" impulses coexisted in nineteenth-century culture, both of which were
"products of the progressive closing of the distance between a person's mind and his ultimate
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economic growth and social strain, he was expected to be a creator
and conservator of law-merging the roles of law-giver and savior of

the Republic.212
A. Remembering the Fathersof the Bench
The legal profession's appetite for biography grew more
voracious in the second half of the nineteenth century. But unlike the
relatively uniform and formulaic character sketches of the antebellum
period, it is difficult to generalize about these works. Memoirs tend to

be more voluminous, with sizeable appendices frequently accompanying them. For instance, the Memoir of Theophilus Parsons
(1859) 213-which is itself 356 pages long-also contains an appendix
with obituary notices and letters from the likes of Fisher Ames, Rufus
King, John Jay, and John Adams, as well as an "Essay on Parallel

Lines: Remarks on the Twenty-Ninth Theorem in the First Book of
authority, his God"); ROSE, supra note 19, at 13 n.16 (viewing both "routinization and personal
autonomy to have been consequences of the replacement of insular traditional communities by
a society made up of complex and socially diverse urban places with mobile populations" and
contending that bureaucratization as often as not expanded the possibilities for selfdevelopment); Fox, supra note 19, at 644 (maintaining that what was distinctive of the period
from 1875 through 1925 was the "nearly boundless idealism about reconstructing society" and
"simultaneous devotion to moral endeavor, and scientific efficiency and expertise"); cf
THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY 60,
80, 85, 137-41 (1977) (observing struggle of social scientists in the second half of the nineteenth
century to "find an intellectual position that would acknowledge the indisputable explanatory
power of positivism while retaining the spiritual comforts of idealism," but also noting growing
"appreciation of organization, and a fascination with the mechanics of social control" far
removed from "the anarchic individualism espoused by... antebellum intellectuals" and finding
there was no room for romantic temperament in the profession of social science). But see
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE
CRISIS OF THE UNION (1965) (contending that the Civil War marked decline of idealism as
"impersonal efficiency" was privileged over pity or compassion); JOHN HIGHAM, FROM
BOUNDLESSNESS TO CONSOLIDATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE,
1840-1860, at 15-16 (1969) (finding that the "radical hopes and reactionary fears of the early
nineteenth-century" subsided by mid-century, giving way to a more "disciplined, less
adventurous culture").
212. There are rather striking similarities between characterizations of the judge and Jesus
in the biographies of the period (interest in the life story of the latter had been growing since
mid-century, with the appearance of scholarly works as well as imaginative reconstructions).
Like the judge, the figure of Jesus underwent something of a metamorphosis from a "gentle"
"sweet" man to one who was "more robust, muscular, and active." Susan Curtis, The Son of
Man and God the Father: The Social Gospel and Victorian Masculinity, in MEANINGS FOR
MANHOOD: CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 67, 73 (Mark C.
Carnes & Clyde Griffen eds., 1990). Moreover, the romantic judge, like Jesus, constituted a
bridge between the realm of ideals and that of worldly practice.
213. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS; WITH NOTICES OF SOME OF HIS
CONTEMPORARIES (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1859).
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Euclid's Elements of Geometry" composed by the judge. Other
works, presenting the "life and letters" of the judge, effectively allow
the subject to speak for himself. One such example is the Life and
Letters of Joseph Story (1851),2 14 a two-volume production, running

over one thousand pages in length. Most of Story's writings (including
private correspondence, poetry, opinions, and orations) are
integrated into the narrative, to the point of almost displacing it,
while the appendix contains memorials and eulogies written in honor

of the judge and an assortment of "opinions" of his writings. This
period also saw the publication of shorter, more standardized judicial
biographies, such as those collected in Bench and Bar volumes and
the Great American Lawyers series. 21 The former, written by

individual lawyers in their leisure hours, contain sketches of the
judges and lawyers of a particular state.2 16 In some volumes, these
sketches are simply organized alphabetically, while others provide

more elaborate narratives, combining institutional history with

biography.217 The latter, edited by William Lewis Draper, aimed at the
214. LIFE AND LETTERS OF STORY, supra note 168.
215. GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: THE LIVES AND INFLUENCE OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS
WHO HAVE ACQUIRED PERMANENT NATIONAL REPUTATION, AND HAVE DEVELOPED THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (William Draper Lewis ed., 1908). Also of note is
WILLIAM L. SNYDER, GREAT OPINIONS BY GREAT JUDGES: A COLLECTION OF IMPORTANT
JUDICIAL OPINIONS BY EMINENT JUDGES (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1885), which

collected opinions written by English and American judges with biographical introductions.
Opinions were selected on the basis of the "vigor, ability, and learning shown," aiming to
provide in a single volume "judgments pronounced by distinguished men, suitable to illustrate
elementary principles in both civil and criminal branches of jurisprudence." Id. at iii-iv.
216. For David Paul Brown, the project was "not a profession, but an enjoyment; not an
aspiration after immortality, but a recreation and solace in ... hours of abstraction from the
most severe conflicts of the mind." 1 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR FORTY YEARS
FULL PRACTICE AT THE PHILADELPHIA BAR lviii (Philadelphia, Robert. H. Small 1856).
W.V.N. Bay advises his readers that The Bench and Bar of Missouri was "written within the last
eight months, and while the author was daily engaged in the discharge of his professional
duties." W.V.N. BAY, REMINISCENCES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI ix (St. Louis,
F.H. Thomas & Co. 1878). And John Belton O'Neall prefaces his BiographicalSketches of the
Bench and Bar of South Carolina by noting they "have been the work of the author for the last
twelve months, or more; every moment of leisure time having been devoted to them." 1 JOHN
BELTON O'NEALL, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF SOUTH CAROLINA
v (Charleston, S.G. Courtenay & Co. 1859).
217. For examples of the former type, see STEPHEN F. MILLER, THE BENCH AND BAR OF
GEORGIA: MEMOIRS AND SKETCHES (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1858); and O'NEALL,
supra note 216. For some of the latter type, see WILLIAM T. DAVIS, BENCH AND BAR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS (Boston, Boston History Co. 1895); JAMES D. LYNCH,
THE BENCH AND BAR OF MISSISSIPPI (New York, E.J. Hale & Son 1881); and EMORY
WASHBURN, SKETCHES OF THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM 1630 TO THE
REVOLUTION IN 1775 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1840). Brown chose to

organize his volumes in such a way as to reflect the sectional crisis: "As TIME reconciles or
controls conflicting DIGNITIES, we have, instead of entering upon the question of precedency
between the judges of the Federal and State courts, thought proper to present them in the order
of their appointments, leaving their relative or comparative official merits, to the judgment of
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construction of a national pantheon, recounting "The Lives and
Influence of Judges and Lawyers Who Have Acquired Permanent
National Reputation, and Have Developed the Jurisprudence of the
United States.

' 21 8

Those solicited to write for the series were law

professors, judges, or lawyers-many of them prominent in their own
right.
For the most part, then, judicial biographies in this period were
composed by legal professionals, although they displayed varying
degrees of sympathy with their subjects. Memoirs of individual judges
tended to be prepared by (legally-trained) relatives or close
associates, who invariably introduced themselves at the outset of their
narrative. "This is an attempt by a son to record the life of his father,"
begins the preface of Story's Life and Letters, "I wish, on its very
threshold, to avow this relation, and to ask every one to bear it in
mind as he reads these pages.

' 21 9

Just to be sure, the son refers to "my

father" throughout the work. An entire chapter of Theophilus
Parsons's memoir-also penned by his son-explains "The Motives
and the Means of the Author for Writing this Memoir.

'220

In it, the

younger Parsons apologizes for "the egotistic appearance imparted to
this Memoir, and to this prefatory chapter, and to this very paragraph,
by the circumstance that I write it in the first person, and speak of the
subject of it as 'my father.' ' ' 221 But he is loathe to follow the

convention of avoiding "the capital 'I,"' because "it compels the
reader to remember that he who is perpetually laboring to avoid
222
speaking of himself, can never, by any possibility, forget himself.1
The authors of standardized biographies relied heavily on
223
second-hand knowledge, and adopted a more impersonal tone.
others." 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at 322.
218. GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 215 (series subtitle).
219. 1 LIFE AND LETrERS OF STORY, supra note 168, at v.
220. PARSONS, supra note 213, at 1.
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id. at 5. The great-grandson of James Kent, however, writes in 1898 with more
detachment, reflecting the influence of a more "scientific" method of writing history. See
WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D.: LATE CHANCELLOR OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK vii-viii (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1898). On the influence of academic
norms of "objective" historical writing within the field of biography, see CASPER, supra note 35,
at 304-06.
223. Usually, authors of collective biographies knew at least a few of their subjects. But they
relied primarily on "friends and acquaintances" of the judges for information and documents.
See, e.g., 1 O'NEALL, supra note 216, at v (acknowledging those who provided materials and
oral recollections of subjects unknown to author); 1 MILLER, supra note 217, at 11, 13 (while
"personally intimate" with several of his subjects, author's work based on exhaustive search
through "[o]ld family chests" and numerous interviews with relatives and friends). For an
example of the more impersonal of post-bellum biographers, see LYNCH, supra note 217, at iv
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Assuming the posture of advocates before the bar of history, they
called witnesses familiar with the character and eminence of the

judicial subject. Previous biographers, they claimed, had overlooked
judicial figures, preferring "actors in the events of ... political,
ecclesiastical and military history" as their subjects. 24 "Surely the rich
mine of American biography cannot be nearly exhausted when such
treasures as the lives of Rutledge, Ellsworth, and Marshall, lie still
undeveloped and comparatively neglected," George Van Santvoord
wrote in the preface of his Sketches of the Lives, Times and Judicial
Services of the ChiefJustices of the Supreme Court of the United States
(1854).225 "The object of the work," explained John Belton O'Neall in
his Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina

(1859), "has been to rescue the memory of the good and great from
oblivion, and to place their actions before their young countrymen, as

marks by the way-side for their journey of life. ' 226 "The fame of a
great jurist, becomes the common property of the profession,"
averred William Porter, "If they do not protect and cherish it, who

("In the composition of this work the author has occupied a neutral ground of observation. Save
in two or three instances, he was neither the professional nor social contemporary of its subjects,
and had no prejudices to subserve or predilections to gratify. Lord Coke says that 'a juror
should stand indifferent as he stands unsworn'; and this has been the exact position of the
author."). Like the authors of the memoirs, they also seemed to believe it important to tell
readers a bit about themselves. David Paul Brown's The Forum begins with a "Proem" in which
he observes that "AUTO-BIOGRAPHY, though sometimes necessary, is rarely agreeable, either
to the Author or the reader. Even when written, as Caesar wrote his Commentaries, in the third
person, the first person is always reflected in the third, and imparts an egotism to the work that
cannot be disguised." 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at xxv. But because he believes "the public has
a right to know what opportunities or advantages were enjoyed by the Author, calculated to
qualify him to speak of these occurrences which he professes to describe," Brown offers a
"Sketch of the Life of the Author, chiefly taken from 'Livingston's Biographies"' (written in the
third person). Id. Similarly, at the beginning of O'Neall's BiographicalSketches of the Bench
and Bar of South Carolina, there is an anonymous sketch of O'Neall (probably written by him),
which begins thus: "As part of the introduction, it may not be amiss that something should be
known of the author." 1 O'NEALL, supra note 216, at xiii.
224. WASHBURN, supra note 217, at 5; see also BAY, supra note 216, at ix-x ("It seems
strange that no one has heretofore made an effort to keep alive the memory of those early
judges and lawyers who did so much for the welfare of our state, and who gave their time,
talents, and labor to the formation of a constitution and code of laws which have so largely
contributed to the preservation of our lives, our property, and our liberty.").
225. GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, SKETCHES OF THE LIVES, TIMES AND JUDICIAL
SERVICES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES iii

(William M. Scott ed., Albany, Weare C. Little & Co. 1882) (1854). Van Santvoord also
indicates another factor motivating biographers in this period-a desire to publicize the unique
virtues of American law. He complains of those who refer to John Marshall as "the American
Mansfield": "[T]o Marshall, the compliment, though just, cannot be deemed flattering. It is
suggestive, at least, of an imitative greatness ... and can add no new dignity to a character like
his, of native, innate strength, and original independent greatness." Id. at 337.
226. 1 O'NEALL, supra note 216, at vi.

19981

LA W AND THE CREATIVE MIND

will?"227
As can be discerned from these prefatory remarks, mid-century
biographers presented their subjects less as models for imitation than
as sources of inspiration. Moreover, they evinced general curiosity
about their ancestors-in-law, and a concern with preserving their
memories. Changes over time in legal institutions and practices were
given more extensive consideration in these works, as their authors
struggled to make sense of the relationship between generations of
legal actors. Biographers exhibited a complex set of attitudes toward
the "Fathers of the Bench. ' 2 8 They spoke of many of the
achievements of their forefathers as impressive and even daunting.
But they also exposed the failings and shortcomings of previous

227. PORTER, supra note 57, at viii.
228. As George Forgie has noted, the generation that came of age at mid-century witnessed
the death of the Founders and confronted uncertain prospects in a society where actual fathers
"ceased to provide more or less automatic models of roles their sons would grow up to play."
GEORGE B. FORGIE, PATRICIDE IN THE HOUSE DIVIDED: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION OF LINCOLN AND HIS AGE 28 (1979). "At a time when expanding economic
opportunity meant that boys were beginning to need a wider range of models than their
surroundings were likely to provide," Forgie explains, "history stepped in to supply them in the
form of founding heroes." Id. at 28-29. "That there was not a close fit of model to need-it was
not, after all, for their commercial exploits that Americans celebrated the fathers-was a
realization that came later when it came at all." Id. at 29. Indeed, the death of the founding
fathers was just the beginning of their immortal rule:
As the physical ties to the beginning grew weaker, the psychological ties to the same
period grew ever stronger, until some people began to fear that the danger facing the
Republic was not that these cords would snap, but that they would be used by the dead
to strangle the living.
Id. at 53; see also HIGHAM, supra note 211, at 18 (finding that a "disturbing sense of remoteness
from the heroic age of the Revolution infiltrated American minds in the middle of the
nineteenth century" and reading attempts to conserve a "national heritage" as "symptoms of a
loss of youthfulness in American culture"). The sense of alienation from one's actual father
became more pronounced as the century drew to a close. As Susan Curtis explains: "For many
children of the middle class, fathers played a diminishing role in the nineteenth century. The
separation of work from home meant that fathers were gone much of the day." Curtis, supra
note 212, at 69. These children were "left with powerful boyish memories of successful fathers
up to whose standards they should try to measure." Id. But they were primarily raised by their
mothers, so that they "experienced an intense complement of ideals-the rugged individualism
of their fathers and the nurture and self-sacrifice of their mothers." Id. at 70. And they came of
age in an economy that "made them think it impossible to attain the individualistic success they
longed for as youths." Id. The rise of a consumer culture, with entertainment institutions
designed to provide relief from the "monotony and degradation of work" combined to
undermine the "Victorian verities of hard work, self-reliance, delayed gratification, and selfcontrol" which had been the ideals of their fathers' generation. Id. The generation who came of
age near the turn of the century turned to Civil War heroes as role models (or at least sources of
inspiration). See, e.g., David Brion Davis, Stress-Seeking and the Self-Made Man in American
Literature: 1894-1914, in WHY MAN TAKES CHANCES: STUDIES IN STRESS-SEEKING 105, 114
(Samuel Z. Klausner ed., 1968) ("As Americans of the 1890's pondered the meaning of success
in a world transformed by industrialization, economic consolidation, and Darwinian notions of
struggle and natural selection, they often looked back to the great Civil War of their fathers'
generation as a key to their national identity.").
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generations, and expressed confidence about their own capacity to
further "the progress of judicial history. '2 9 For instance, in his
Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar (1842), Wilkins Updike spoke
admiringly of the "natural geniuses," who were in greater supply in
the early years of the profession. And he lamented the fact that, in
more recent times, "[t]he labor of thinking, and of mental origination,
is greatly diminished by the rich productions emanating from learned
brethren, emulous of fame."230 Yet he viewed the legal proceedings of
his ancestors as comparatively crude affairs; trials were dramatic
performances in which advocates appealed to the passion of jurors
while judges remained passive, considering themselves "fortunate, if,
by their silence, they escaped unwounded in the conflict. '23 1 Noting
recent procedural reforms, he assured his readers that "[t]his
'232
ameliorating progress is onward.
By the late 1850s, however, this optimism waned and a shriller
tone surfaced. Biographers increasingly looked to the profession's
past to allay their fears about the future. David Paul Brown, author of
The Forum; or Forty Years Full Practice at the Philadelphia Bar
(1856), decried his brethren's ignorance of the traditions of their
"professional family. ' 233 Although he recognized that "[e]very man
forms for himself his own horizon," he suggested that
if that which is seen or known by those of one age, were transferred
to those of succeeding ages, the scope of man's mental vision would
be incalculably enlarged, and thus by avoiding the errors and faults,
or emulating the wisdom and virtues of the past; the present,instead
of being an age of experiment,
would be an age of comparative
234
certainty and security.
But even Brown thought the "emulous" son capable "not only of
235
sharing, but rivalling or even improving the glory of his father.
Paging beyond these prefaces and introductions, the reader
encounters a rather motley bunch of judicial figures-drawn to
convey "life-like" and "true" impressions of them. One can get better
acquainted with the wig-donning lay judges of the colonial period,
including Thomas Danforth, who "satisfactorily" dispensed justice
229.

WILKINS UPDIKE, MEMOIRS OF THE RHODE-ISLAND BAR xi

Webb & Co. 1842).
230. Id. at x.
231. Id. at xi.
232. Id.
233. 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at cxxvii.
234. Id. at cxxvi-cxxvii.
235. Id. at cxxvii.

(Boston, Thomas H.
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without "judicial learning '236 and Samuel Sewall, who brought order
to Massachusetts's "chaotic. . . system of legal practice," though he is
chiefly remembered for "[h]is connexion with the trials at Salem in
1692." 37 For the historical record, Sewall's biographer added:
He acted with entire honesty of conviction while pursuing the
horrid though fancied crime of witchcraft, but when convinced...
that it was all a delusion, with equal honesty and ingenuousness he
confessed his errors, and ...asked forgiveness
of God and his
238
fellow men for the part he took in those trials.
Biographers found quite a bit more to admire in the pioneering
judges of the post-Revolutionary period. All the same, it had to be
admitted that these men retained a rather unseemly attachment to
their "mother country" and were relatively unsophisticated in their
tastes. Thomas McKean, "although theoretically attached to the
democracy of the time," had a somewhat "supercilious mode of
discharging his official duty"; and Bushrod Washington's reading
"was so limited that it was questionable whether he even knew who
was the author of Macbeth." 239 Biographers duly noted the increased
learning and independence of the succeeding generations of
American judges, but candor required the full disclosure of their
faults and foibles (Judge Gibson was actually doodling and writing
poetry on the bench rather than taking copious notes of the
proceedings) as well as their virtues. 240 In surveying this gallery of
judicial figures, it is nevertheless possible to identify one thing that
they all shared in common: they were crucially shaped by their
ancestral inheritance and deeply influenced by the natural and social
236. WASHBURN, supra note 217, at 251.
237. Id. at 260.
23& Id. Writing sixteen years later, Brown was less condescending in his estimation of these
judges. "[T]he bench of the republic in our own day," he observed, is less "revered or
respected" than that of the colonial judiciary, whose members were more likely to possess
"good principles, good habits, and good manners." 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at 255.
239. 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at 327-30, 357.
240. As Brown notes in his sketch of Gibson:
[H]e was not a good Nisi Prius Judge. In the conflicts of a jury trial, he was not a good
listener; he would not unfrequently be employed in writing poetry or drawing some
fancy sketch, when the bar supposed he was closely engaged in noting the course of the
evidence, or preparing his opinion. And in a rather merry way, he once remarked, that
he had reached at last the object of his highest ambition, which was to keep his eye
fixed upon a dull speaker, while his thoughts were employed with more agreeable
objects. 'This,' he added, 'is certainly a great judicial triumph.'
Id. at 429; see also BEERS, supra note 194, at 6, 17 (It was "whispered by tradition" that
Sherman had once "so far yielded to prevailing custom as to chew tobacco-a habit he soon
renounced and forever after eschewed" and it was said by many that he "lacked a certain
personal attraction-a magnetic warmth which has only to brush against its kind to kindle a
responsive heart-beat.").
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environments in which they lived.
The frank, historical approach of these judicial biographers
should not, however, obscure the ideological nature of their work. As
was the case with antebellum writers, their sketches and memoirs
were shaped by the exigencies of their profession. And, as they wrote,
they were reconstructing ideals of judicial behavior in response to a
new set of circumstances: the low repute of the judiciary in the wake
of the Civil War, nationalization, Darwinism, economic consolidation,
2 41
industrial disorder, and the exposure of corruption in high places.
These were circumstances that called for the genius of the heroic
judge.
B. Reconstructions of the JudicialIdeal
Difficult as it is to generalize about judicial biographies in the
second half of the nineteenth century, it is nevertheless possible to
discern the outlines of a new judicial ideal in this period. Given the
influence of romanticism within American legal culture, this might
seem surprising. For, as we have seen, judicial biographers tended to
emphasize the idiosyncrasies and distinctive qualities of their subjects.
To reduce their celebrations of the genius of the judge to a single
ideal would thus seem to be an exercise in contradiction. But in many
respects, that is what biographers themselves were attempting to do
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. That is, they
were struggling to construct a model of adjudication which
acknowledged the judge's genius without reducing his decisions to
expressions of personal bias. The romantic judge that emerged from
their works possessed three key attributes: (1) creative power, (2)
strength of intellect, and (3) courageous independence. It should be
noted, however, that the neoclassical model was not wholly displaced
in this period. The craftsman continued to be a valued member of the
bench, because those possessing true genius were few and far
between.
The romantic judge was a creative figure, bringing order out of
chaos, and giving law to his countrymen. The individuals most often
associated with this quality were John Marshall, James Kent, and

241. See Stephen Botein, "What We Shall Meet Afterward in Heaven": Judgeship as a
Symbol for Modern American Lawyers, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN
AMERICA, supra note 15, at 49 (noting that the reputation of the judiciary "eroded" in the
decades following the Civil War); see also HABER, supra note 19, at 206-39.
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Joseph Story. 242 Antebellum eulogies had acknowledged Chief Justice
Marshall as the "strenuous defender and expounder of the
' 244
Constitution," 243 who "mould[ed] his own genius into its elements,
but post-bellum biographers attributed even greater formative

powers to Marshall. "He was not the commentator upon American
constitutional law; he was not the expounder of it;" insisted Edward J.

Phelps in 1879, "he was the author, the creator of it.

'245

Biographers

took James Kent at his word when he modestly claimed "I had
nothing to guide me, and was left at liberty to assume all such English

Chancery powers and jurisdiction as I thought applicable under our
Constitution." 246 Indeed, in the homeland of the Yankee, ingenuity
was required of the judge. "Novel" questions were raised about

human inventions and improvements in the young country, explained
William Story, and his father "was destined to be in great measure"

the "creator" of patent law. 247 But creative acts were not performed
by this triumvirate alone, 248 and biographers recognized that the need
for ingenious judges did not decline as the nation matured.249 It should
242. Biographers treated these three judges as standards by which others could be judged.
Thus Henry William DeSaussure was "to South Carolina what Kent was to New York" and
John Hemphill was hailed as the John Marshall of Texas. See 1 O'NEALL, supra note 216, at
245; LYNCH, supra note 166, at 69.
243. HORACE BINNEY, EULOGY ON JOHN MARSHALL (1835), reprinted in 3 JOHN
MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 281, 305 (John F. Dillon ed., 1903)
[hereinafter JOHN MARSHALL].
244. JOSEPH STORY, LIFE, CHARACTER AND SERVICES OF CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL
(1835), reprintedin 3 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 327, 377.
245. E.J. PHELPS, CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF HIS
TIME 6 (Philadelphia, E.C. Markley & Son 1879).
246. KENT, supra note 222, at 158; see also CHARLES B. ELLIOT, AN AMERICAN
CHANCELLOR (1903).
247. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF STORY, supra note 168, at 234.
248. The younger Theophilus figures his father as a law-giver, of sorts:
I had prepared a large number of extracts, to show how frequently he declared
important rules, sometimes only on the authority of his personal knowledge ... simply
declaring that this rule or that was the law.... [Ulpon the whole, so far as I have been
able to learn, the great body of his law stands unquestioned.
PARSONS, supra note 213, at 238 (emphasis added).
249. In particular, conditions in the Western regions of the country called for judges of this
stripe. Oral Milo Roberts, an "ambitious and aspiring youth," was one of the judges who rose to
the occasion:
He was the first judge of the district under the judiciary system of the [Texas] State
government, and the task devolved upon him of establishing a course of procedure in
conformity with the new order of things .... [Flew questions of importance had been
settled by the Supreme Court of the Republic, and the untamed elements of its
jurisprudence mingled with the unexplored streams of the new system.... But his
ability and industry met all the requirements of the situation; and, gathering up the
legal fragments of the revolution and annexation, he blended them into a harmonious
machinery, and made a lasting impression upon the jurisprudence of the State.
LYNCH, supra note 166, at 277.
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also be noted that the virtues of creativity were not universally

acclaimed. For instance, some post-bellum biographers (particularly
those with Southern sympathies) presented dissenting views of
Marshall's judicial performance, suggesting he took too many
liberties with the Constitution.250
The creative faculty was inborn and closely related to another

characteristic of the romantic judge-his "strong native intellect. '251
No amount of mental discipline could train a judge to do what came
naturally to Judge Parsons: "'As light and spongy articles are reduced

to portable size by hydraulic pressure, so the verbose readings of the
law were, by the force of his great mind, reduced to clear, practical
rules.' ' 252 Although the romantic judge's mind was "too comprehensive to admit of ready concentration," when he "brought the lens of

his mind to a focus, its power was resistless, and every man seemed to
perceive and to feel it, but himself." 253 Yet the duties of the bench
taxed the strength of even the strongest of minds. Robert Raymond
Reid heroically struggled to maintain his composure on the bench,
though his private journal revealed the mental anguish his office
250. William Mikell, a professor of law, expresses an especially interesting perspective on
Marshall in his biographical sketch of Taney:
Marshall, the first great builder of our national jurisprudence, was given the
constitutional plan of the new edifice, and proceeded to erect a stately structure. As it
grew under his master-hand the desire to build strongly overcame his sense of
proportion, and he departed more and more from the original plan, using the stones
intended for the wings to buttress more firmly the central building, until the whole,
however wonderful it was, differed greatly from that planned by the architects. It was
well that Marshall was succeeded as chief builder by another master builder who set
himself patriotically to work to bring the structure he was commissioned to build into
greater harmony with the original plan. The time for a change was opportune. If the
structure was ever to be brought into harmony with the ideas of those who originally
planned it, it was best that it be done while it was still possible to remodel it without
actually tearing it down.
William E. Mickell, Roger Brooke Taney, in 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 215, at
75, 105-06.
251. L.B. PROCTOR, THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW-YORK 508 (New York, Diossy & Co.
1870) (referring to Samuel H. Fitzhugh). Biographers seem especially interested in drawing
connections between mental and physical attributes of the judge. Randal M. Ewing's treatment
of John Marshall is typical:
Mr. Marshall's physique was admirably adapted to sustain and second his most
vigorous mental efforts. Six feet, one and one-half inches in height, fleshy even to
corpulence, a perfect digestion, and the muscles of an athlete; pain and sickness were
strangers to him.... His head was massive and peculiar in shape. When face to face
you would, at the first glance, pronounce him defective in frontal development, the
forehead being low and narrow, but viewed in profile you would be astonished to find
such an immense "dome of thought" in the rear of this narrow portico.
RANDAL M. EWING, SOME OF THE CHARACFERISTICS OF JOHN MARSHALL: A PAPER READ
BEFORE THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF TENNESSEE 15 (Nashville, A.B. Tavel 1884).
252. PARSONS, supra note 213, at 207 (quoting Judge Putnam in Deblois v. Ocean Ins. Co.,
33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 303, 310 (1835)).
253. 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at 429 (referring to John Bannister Gibson).
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caused

him:

"The

court almost over,

and I exhausted

and

harassed.... My health and constitution are impaired. I must adopt a
course different from that I have pursued in order to preserve SANITY
of mind and body!
Ultimately, however, the mental citadel of the
romantic judge remained impregnable-resisting even the incursions
of his own body: "his bodily tenement showing that, though age had
come upon the outward man, the mind within was still bright and
burning."2 1
Before this inevitable physical decline, the outward appearance
'256
of the romantic judge suggested a "robust and rugged manhood.
254. 2 MILLER, supra note 217, at 204. Lucius Lamar was not so fortunate: "Aiming to
extend the conquests of his profound intellect to the verge of human possibility, he overtasked
his nervous system" and took his own life. The biographer first attributes this "deplorable act"
to somatic causes, concluding that it resulted from "accidental derangement of the cerebral
organism." Id. at 139. However several paragraphs later he describes the "secret canker in his
mind" in non-physiological terms: "[H]e was unhappy." Id. at 144. The practice of law (if David
Brown's "biography" of himself can be taken as a reliable indicator) could be equally strenuous:
A lawyer's life, it may be said, without intending any play upon words, is emphatically
a life of trials. He has scarcely any domestic existence .... He neither rises nor falls
with political dynasties ... and has his being almost solely amidst the crowds and
clamors of diversified litigation.... One day is like another in this-that all are busyall are anxious-all are made up of hopes and fears, clouds and sunshine; and so
continuous and unvaried is this truth, that this uninterrupted variety actually becomes
monotony, still running as it were, in a circle, travelling over the same ground, and
knowing no end.
1 BROWN, supra note 216, at cxxiii-cxxiv. This is actually the concluding paragraph of the
biography-a depressing yet strangely heroic vision of the profession. For further evidence of
the mental trials legal professionals endured (or, in some cases, relieved through other
activities), see BEERS, supra note 194, at 10 (the "hard-worked" Roger Minott Sherman sought
to "soften the dull prose of his professional duties" through literary pursuit); and see generally
Rotundo, supra note 199, at 29, 32 (noting general anxiety about mental breakdown among
middle-class men in second half of nineteenth century because they were increasingly engaged
in nonmanual labor or "brain work" which involved reading, studying, and office tasks).
255. 1 O'NEALL, supra note 216, at 162. This was said in reference to Judge John Smith
Richardson, who was the subject of a legislative investigation regarding his allegedly permanent
"bodily and mental infirmity." Richardson (who was seventy years of age) presented an
elaborate defense of his mental fitness-recorded in the biographical sketch. He reminded
legislators that Chancellor Kent "at more than eighty years of age" still retained "his vigorous
mind" and Chief Justice Marshall, "who died at the age of eighty-one, still stood the pride and
glory of the Federal Bench." See id. at 167. The resolution calling for his removal failed. In a
similar vein, we are shown that age was the least of the Taney Court's problems during the term
in which the Dred Scott case was decided. The biographer of Benjamin Robbins Curtis quotes
from a letter dated February 27, 1857: "Our aged Chief Justice, who will be eighty years old in a
few days, and who grows more feeble in body ... retains his alacrity and force of mind
wonderfully .. " But "[p]oor Judge Daniel ha[d] been prostrated for months by what was a
sufficient cause; for his young and interesting wife was burned to death by her clothes
accidentally taking fire, almost in his presence." 1 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS,
LL.D. WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 193-94 (Benjamin
R. Curtis ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1879).
256. VAN SANTVOORD, supra note 225, at 296 (referring to John Marshall). For a general
discussion of ideas about manhood in the second half of the century, see HILKEY, supra note 35,
at 142-43 ("The preoccupation with manhood in the second half of the nineteenth century in
part reflected the fact that ideas about what it meant to be a man were in flux. Changes in the
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Appearances, in this case, did not lie, for he acted with courageous
independence in the performance of his judicial services. Although
exhibiting a "due reverence for established precedent, he took care to
test it in the retort of his own logic, and to pass it through the crucible
of his own judgment. ' 25 7 The "impartiality" so highly regarded in
antebellum sketches was here subtly transformed into a more virile
form of detachment, requiring "self-possession ' ' 258 and an "iron
will." 259 Consider, for example, the rendering of Bushrod Washington
in David Paul Brown's "Gallery of Portraits." Washington was still
praised for "[h]is learning, his patient hearing, his clear and
discriminating sagacity," but what now distinguished him "above all"
was "his unhesitating fearlessness. ''26° Brown called him "the greatest
Nisi Prius judge that the world has known," citing a prize case in
which "State-right's men affected to hold the power of the general
government in contempt" in support of his claim. 261 When popular
agitation mounted, "[i]t was publicly proclaimed, that Judge
Washington would never dare to charge against the defendants; or to
pronounce sentence against them, if they were convicted. ' 26 2 But they
did not know the man: "He was too intrepid to be bullied-and he
DID charge decidedly against the defendants; they WERE convicted,
and he SENTENCED them. '263 The judge did this in full view of the
public, proclaiming the importance of affording citizens the
opportunity "to witness the administrationof the justice of the country;
to which, ALL MEN, GREAT AND SMALL, ARE ALIKE BOUND TO
SUBMIT. ' 264 When faced with a choice between principle and

relations of work, home, and family brought about by industrialization and urbanization
narrowed and redefined men's roles as well as women's."). For a discussion specific to the legal
profession, see Michael Grossberg, Institutionalizing Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine
Profession, in MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD, supra note 212, at 133.
257. LYNCH, supra note 166, at 89 (referring to Abner Smith Lipscomb).
258. See, e.g., WILLIAM WILLIS, A HISTORY OF THE LAW, THE COURTS, AND THE
LAWYERS OF MAINE, FROM ITS FIRST COLONIZATION TO THE EARLY PART OF THE PRESENT

CENTURY 310-11 (Portland, Bailey & Noyes 1863); see also 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at 356.
259. E.g., LYNCH, supra note 166, at 95 (referring to Royal T. Wheeler); THOMAS J.
SEMMES, ADDRESS ON THE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES 9 (New
Orleans, L. Graham & Son 1890) (referring to Roger Taney).
260. 1 BROWN, supra note 216, at 377.
261. Id. at 356, 377.
262. Id. at 377-78.
263. Id. at 378.
264. Id. Even in Brown's portrait of William Tilghman, which is almost a complete
plagiarism of Binney's eulogy (openly acknowledged as such), he concludes "[t]hat he was a
man of courage no man can doubt," id. at 394, though there is no evidence of this quality in the
sketch itself.
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expediency, the romantic judge's "unswerving rectitude
decided the case, and he never

applause.

' 266

'265

always

suffered from the "love

of

Yet as his biographer considered the judge's "peculiar

independence," he nervously acknowledged potential shortcomings
' 267
of his hero: "too great a disregard of the opinions of his fellowmen,
2 68
and "too great reliance on himself.
The figure of the romantic judge was well-constructed to provide
encouragement to a legal profession "struggling to span the abyss
between its high-sounding ideals and ...its dull, trivial and even
sordid quotidian practices, to express an idea of law as a calling that
could lead a man to honor, social usefulness and self-respect. '269 Yet

the source of the judge's inspiration remained obscure in these
portraits. Some biographers saw the hand of God in the creations of
the judge. Others suggested a confluence of biological and spiritual

influences. Philip Slaughter, starting from the premise that "all
human beings inherit the nature of our fallen forefathers," sought by
the process of "induction" to demonstrate the transmission of
"hereditary genius. '270 It was no accident, he implied, that many of
Judge William Green's forebears displayed a "fondness and a fitness

265. Id. at 373.
266. 1 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, supra note 255, at 453.
267. Id. at 451, 452.
268. 1 MILLER, supra note 217, at 189 (referring to Augustin S. Clayton)
269. Robert Gordon, Law as a Vocation: Holmes and the Lawyer's Path, in THE PATH OF
THE LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1, 8 (forthcoming 1999). For more on the crisis of the
bar in post-bellum America, see Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law":
Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS:
LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 58-62 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (attributing
disintegration of legal elite's ideal vision of legal order in period from 1885 through 1910 to new
legal constructions of the corporate form, intellectual critiques of idea of neutral legal science,
and shift of locus of legal practice from courtroom to law office and conference room);
Grossberg, supra note 256, at 143-45 (describing crisis of professional ideals occasioned by rise
of corporate legal practice and growing specialization and stratification, resulting in decline of
"conviviality" among practitioners and contentious quest for new professional standards); and
HABER, supra note 19, at 236 (noting most common lament in last decades of nineteenth
century was that "law was falling from its honored position in society as a profession and had
become an ordinary trade").
270. SLAUGHTER, supra note 194, at 61, 64. Slaughter explains that he undertook this study
before coming across FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY GENIUS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS LAWS
AND CONSEQUENCES (London, MacMillan & Co. 1869) which contains a section devoted to
English judges. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 194, at 70. (The reference in the pamphlet is to
"Dalton" which I assume to be a printing error or misspelling on the part of Slaughter.)
Although providing an "enumeration" of Galton's findings, Slaughter does so with some reserve
and commends to his readers a set of lectures on heredity by a Joseph Cook, who "has discussed
it from the Christian stand-point, with a combination of learning, logic and eloquence, rarely
surpassed." Id. at 71. For a discussion of Galton's work and its significance within the history of
psychology, see ROBINSON, supra note 21, at 241, 336-37.
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for the law. 2' 71 This was not meant to imply, however, that man was
the prisoner of his heritage: "by the power of his own will, especially
if aided by help from on high" he could "modify, and even ...

conquer these tendencies, if ill, and strengthen those which are
good.

' 272

Others refrained from speculating on the matter, exalting

the manifestations of genius without analyzing its nature. To search
for the source of the "subtle quality of the mind ... we call genius"
was an exercise in futility, from James Lynch's perspective.273 "[F]or

the mind to attempt to fathom itself," he insisted, "is the mad butt of
thought against the inconceivable-the push of airy nothing against
infinity. ' 271Lynch was quite certain, nonetheless, that "the true course
of genius is upward," though "often perverted and prostituted to

unhallowed purposes by the wayward passions that flourish in its
train. '275 While genius "glowed in the natural laws of Kepler and the
civil code of Justinian, flashed through the glasses of Galileo, and
illuminated the hallowed visions of Luther," he observed, "it also
glittered in the crown of Alexander, burnished the helmet of Caesar,
and flamed in the sword of Bonaparte. '27 6 Despite this lack of

definition, however, there is one point on which all biographers are
clear: genius accounts for man's greatest accomplishments, but is not
responsible for the destructive acts committed by man.
C. Providenceand the Law-Giver
The celebration of the romantic judge reached its high-water

mark on February 1, 1901. On that day, members of the bench and
bar joined statesmen and citizens in observing "John Marshall Day,"
271. SLAUGHTER, supra note 194, at 63.
272. Id. at 73 n. These qualifications are stated in a long footnote after the list of Galton's
results. In the footnote, Slaughter suggests a comparable American family of lawyers and other
eminent men: the Randolphs of Virginia. His qualifying remarks come in a final paragraph,
worth reproducing in full:
The transmission of physical tendencies by descent is a fact well-known, so that every
one comes into the world with intellectual, physical, and, to some extent, moral
heritage from all his ancestors, which it would be as impossible to count as it would be
to discriminate the countless drops of rain which compose a river. It should not,
however, be forgotten, that every man, by the power of his own will, especially if aided
from on high, can modify, and even so conquer these tendencies, if ill, and strengthen
those which are good, as to establish, as it were, an improved stock, &c. To expand the
whole subject, even if the writer were capable of doing it, would demand a separate
treatise.
Id.
273. See LYNCH, supra note 166, at 13.
274. Id. at 5.
275. Id. at 14.
276. Id. at 14-15.
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marking the centennial anniversary of Marshall's ascension to the
Supreme Court. The story behind this celebration was movingly told
by John Dillon in his introduction to a three-volume collection of the
addresses delivered in honor of the occasion. 277 The mere suggestion
of Aldoph Moses (of the Chicago Bar Association) that such an event
be staged "struck a sympathetic chord which vibrated throughout the
land. '27 8 Bar associations and law schools joined forces in planning
this "truly national event" (which was somehow celebrated in a
"voluntary, spontaneous" fashion). The event itself, Dillon proudly
added, exceeded all expectations. Commemorative exercises were
held at the national capital and in thirty-seven states and territories of
the union (in those states where there was no observance, "the
omission was due to accidental causes").279 Orations were delivered
by "leaders of the bar, by members of the highest Federal and State
courts, and by eminent statesmen and scholars."2 8° Dillon was
particularly pleased to report "the estimation in which Marshall is
held in the parts of the Union that clung longest to the doctrine of
State's Rights and strict construction, and that made these the legal
justification of the Civil War. '281 He saw this as irrefutable evidence
that "the results of the Civil War are everywhere loyally accepted,
'' 2
and that all sections and all parties rejoice in a re-united country. 1
To the eminent Chief Justice thanks were due, for his valiant defense
of the "principle of nationality" against the "heresies of nullification
and secession." 3 The Confederacy "surrendered not more truly to
Grant in the field than to Marshall's great judgments expounding the
Constitution."28
Of course, Dillon's story must be read more as wishful thinking
than an accurate report of John Marshall Day. Not only does he
misrepresent the general political climate of the period (which was
277. See John F. Dillon, Introduction,in 1 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at vii-xi. The
concept of publishing a volume was first suggested by Justice Shiras who thought that "[a]
collection of the addresses ...if put in a permanent form, would ...be very interesting as
showing a consensus of opinion concerning Marshall on the part of eminent lawyers in all parts
of the country." Id. at viii.
278. Id. at xi.
279. Id. at ix.
280. Id.
281. Id. at xvi.
282. Id. Therefore, he continues in a conciliatory tone, "we are not sorry to hear, in one or
two of the addresses, a soldier or a judge of the Confederacy heave a natural sigh or utter a
tender lament over the 'Lost Cause."' Id.
283. Id. at xiii.
284. Id.
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when "Judge Lynch" was at the height of his activity28s), but he
overstates public confidence in the courts. Moreover, he masks splits
within the legal profession-especially concerning the status of the
judiciary. As Stephen Botein has observed, "By 1900, on the
threshold of the Progressive era, the courts faced severe criticism not
only from labor leaders, populists, and socialists, but also from some
respectable members of the legal profession, which was at long last
beginning to develop a formal apparatus for collective deliberation
and policymaking. ' 28 6 The "symbolism of judgeship," he explains, was
deployed by professional ideologues to deflect attention from internal
divisions and to promote their own vision of an independent bar. 287 In
such a climate, John Marshall Day could not have been the
expression of national or professional unity Dillon made it out to be.
It is better seen as an effort on the part of legal elites to shore up the
status of a beleaguered profession. In paying their respects to the
memory of "the great John Marshall," participants were offering "a
refutation of the notion sometimes expressed, that the lawyers as a
profession have lost their high ideals." 288
Yet wherein lay Marshall's greatness? Many speakers assumed
the question without further reflection. Those who did address it
converged on a common answer, expressed most succinctly by
Massachusetts Attorney General Knowlton: "The hour of fate had
come; and he was the man of the hour. 2 89 That is, the Chief Justice
was great because he, a simple lawyer of humble origins, rose to the
occasion provided by "an overruling Providence. '290 His appointed
function in the genesis of the American Republic was to give law to
285. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 506-07.
286. Botein, supra note 241, at 55 (emphasis added).
287. See id. at 63.
288. Henry D. Ashley, Remarks, in 2 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 548, 548
(exercises in Kansas City). Gardiner Lathrop's address exemplifies this effort:
It is in this age of greed a very gratifying thing that the American people, and
especially the American Bar, can turn from the pursuit of the ordinary vocations of life
and do honor to one of their greatest representatives, who reflected credit upon them
all. It goes to show that honest merit, that great ability, that unswerving integrity, still
have a place in the world, superior to the mere acquisition of wealth; and that the man
who does his duty well and faithfully will live in the grateful memory of those who
come after him.
Gardiner Lathrop, Remarks, in 2 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 546, 547 (exercises in
Kansas City).
289. Attorney-General Knowlton, Address, in 1 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 197,
201 (exercises in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts).
290. Id. Similarly, E.H. Stiles observed that Marshall "belongs to the class of men who are
born great, and also to the class of men who achieve greatness by their own exertions." E.H.
Stiles, Remarks, in 2 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 548, 549 (exercises in Kansas City).

19981

LA W AND THE CREATIVE MIND

the people. Just as Moses was "at the birth of the ten command29g
ments," so too was Marshall "at the birth of constitutional law." '
Though he was not the "maker" of the Constitution, Marshall was
rightly called its "first and greatest expounder" and, indeed, its

savior.

92

For the Constitution was but a "skeleton"-a mere

"agreement between conflicting States" when Marshall was called to
the bench. 293 He delivered his country through a crucial passage in its

history, performing "an original work of the most transcendent
importance": the creation of a legal edifice on the foundation of the
Constitution. 29 4 And he ensured the preservation of constitutional

government through the maintenance of an independent judiciary.
During his service as Chief Justice, then, Marshall combined roles of

creator

and

conservator

of law:

"His

genius

pierced

[the

Constitution's] innermost recesses; ...discovered its powers, and the

'form' was metamorphosed into a 'governmental organism,' and then,
pervaded by Marshall's soul, it vivified, lived, lives, and will never
die. ' 295 Ultimately, Marshall's greatness lay in his ability to act
creatively under laws of his own origination. In doing so, he bore a
striking resemblance to his Maker.
Before passing from the scene of John Marshall Day, however, a
dissenting voice should be heard-one which called into question the

very possibility of judicial independence. "A great man represents a
great ganglion in the nerves of society," Oliver Wendell Holmes
declared in his commemorative address, "and part of his greatness

291. John McClure, Address, in 3 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 3, 9 (exercises in
Arkansas).
292. John F. Dillon, Address, in 1 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 345, 357 (exercises in
New York). William B. Hornblower's address provides an especially compelling image of
Marshall as savior:
[H]ad he not assumed his office at the precise period when he did and delivered the
magnificent series of opinions which came from his lips and from his pen, which
welded together the sovereign and independent States of the Union and which armed
the Federal Government with the power necessary to preserve our institutions while
guarding the reserved rights of the States and the citizens thereof, the fair fabric which
had been constructed by the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and which had been so
unwillingly adopted by many of the States ...would have fallen to pieces under the
strain of the conflicting interest of its various constituents.
William B. Hornblower, Address, in 1 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 339, 341 (exercises
in New York).
293. William Warner, Remarks, in 2 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 544, 545, 546
(exercises at Kansas City).
294. Dillon, supra note 292, at 358.
295. John N. Baldwin, Address, in 2 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 428, 438 (exercises
in Iowa); see also John F. Phillips, Response, in 2 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 549
(describing how Marshall "vivified" the Constitution) (exercises in Kansas City).
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consists in his being there. 2 96 Observers of this performance, such as
President Roosevelt, may have been justified in finding this orator's
deflationary words a bit "unworthy" of the occasion. 297 But in putting
Marshall in his historical place, Holmes was well within the
conventions of nineteenth-century judicial portraiture. For the
speaker who preceded Holmes emphasized the fortuitous circumstances surrounding Marshall's appointment. 298 And the one who
followed him reflected upon the extent to which "we seem to be living
in a different world from Marshall's," facing questions of far greater
variety and complexity. 299 When considered in the context of these
and other addresses, what seems to set Holmes's remarks apart is not
his historical consciousness. Rather, it is his uncanny appreciation of
the finitude of human consciousness. "We live by symbols," he
observed,
and what shall be symbolized by any image of the sight depends
upon the mind of him who sees it. The setting aside of this day in
honor of a great judge may stand to a Virginian for the glory of his
glorious State; to a patriot for the fact that time has been on
Marshall's side, and that the theory for which Hamilton argued,
and he decided, and Webster spoke, and Grant fought, and Lincoln
died, is now our cornerstone. To the more abstract but fartherreaching contemplation of the lawyer, it stands for the rise of a new
body of jurisprudence, by which guiding principles are raised above
the reach of statute and State, and judges are entrusted with a
solemn and hitherto unheardof authority and duty.3°°
But "[t]o one who lives in what may seem to him a solitude of
thought" - presumably Holmes himselfthis day marks the fact that all thought is social, is on its way to
action; ...every idea tends to become first a catechism and then a
code; and that according to its worth his unhelped meditation may
one day mount a throne, and without armies, or even with them,
may shoot across the world the electric despotism of an unresisted
power. 01
In presenting such a sobering view of the way "we" think, Holmes
foreshadowed the breakdown of the romantic ideal of judging and the

296. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Response, in 1 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 204, 205.
297.

See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER

SELF 300 (1993).
298. See Knowlton, supra note 289, at 197-204.
299. James Bradley Thayer, Address, in 1 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 243, at 209, 239
(exercises in Harvard University).
300. Holmes, supra note 296, at 207-08.
301. Id. at 208.
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emergence of a new heroic figure: the skeptical judge. 0 2 The symbol
of Oliver Wendell Holmes was yet to have its day.
IV. THE SKEPTICISM OF THE JUDGE, 1900-1930
[W]e are in the universe, not it in us.
-Oliver

Wendell Holmes 03

The celebrations of the "independent judiciary" intensified into a
bona fide crusade in the early decades of the twentieth century,
taking on almost "cultist" dimensions. 3° As cries protesting "judicial
oligarchy" rang out and the judicial recall movement gathered steam,
the American Bar Association took up the cause of "judgeship, if not
of judges."3 5 Leaders of the Association launched a national
campaign of public education, using the issue of judicial recall as an
opportunity to elevate the image of the organization and the legal
profession in general. The illustrious Rome G. Brown, who led the
campaign, emphasized the "heresy" entailed in the very idea of
judicial recall. "The question," he observed, "which confronts us is,
Shall our government remain a government of laws or shall it become
merely a government of men? 3t1 6 He decried efforts to reduce judges
to the "servile instruments" of the people, insisting that they remain
servants only of the law ...free to heed the admonition given by
Moses to the Judges of the Israelites: "Ye shall not respect persons

302. The ways romantic psychology informed Holmes's writings are explored in Anne C.
Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 DUKE L.J. 429 (1998). For works suggesting that
Holmes departed from the romanticism of his father's generation, see FREDRICKSON, supra
note 211, at 208 (Holmes sounded a new note among contemporaries, expressing a "realistic and
stoical acceptance of the fact that no educated elite could really control the evolution of society"
because men of law, like men of war, were "at the mercy of history."); and Peter Gibian,
Opening and Closing the Conversation:Style and Stance from Holmes Senior to Holmes Junior,
in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra note 15, at 186, 199 ("While before
the war Holmes Junior had seemed to be following in his father's footsteps as a dreamy,
Emerson-inspired student with that earlier period's characteristic 'problem of vocation,' after
the war he would ...quickly give up his dabbling in philosophy and poetry, applying himself
with new martial spirit to specialized study of the law.").
303. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Dr. John C.H. Wu (May 5, 1926), in
JUSTICE HOLMES TO DOCTOR Wu: AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921-1932, at 34, 35
(1935?).
304. See Botein, supra note 241, at 63. This development coincides with the rise of a cult of
the Constitution. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 22-23 (1986).
305. Botein, supra note 241, at 55.
306. ROME G. BROWN, THE JUDICIARY AS THE SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE 10 (1913)
(originally given before the Tennessee State Bar Association, Annual Meeting on June 26,
1913).
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in judgment, but ye shall hear the small as well as the great; ye shall
not be afraidof the face of man; for the judgment is God's. 30 7
William Howard Taft, who represented a more progressive,
reformist branch of the bar, was nevertheless unrestrained in his
expressions of "love" for judges and courts, intimating that "'[t]hey
are my ideals on earth of what we shall meet afterwards in Heaven
under a just God.""'38 Equally impassioned addresses were delivered
at bar association meetings throughout the nation, where speakers
could be heard lamenting the deplorable condition of "the strangled
judge" and warning that the judiciary is "the one brake yet remaining
on the runaway engine of this republic. ' 309 In their presentations of
the case for an independent judiciary, however, one can detect more
than a measure of self-doubt. What was once said of Browning may
be also said of the ABA member: "The burly assurance in his voice
had no counterpart in his inner being."310
While leaders of the bar moved tirelessly from dinner speech to
dinner speech, a number of young intellectuals within the profession
were busily constructing a new ideal of judgeship in the image of
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Influenced by progressivism, pragmatism,
and developments in the social sciences, these thinkers-most of
them legal academics-characterized the judiciary as a branch of
government that had become too far removed from the social and
economic realities of contemporary American life. Holmes's dissent
in Lochner v. New York"' (1905) was a galvanizing force, inspiring
the publication of articles in legal periodicals "decrying various
features of jurisprudential orthodoxy, from syllogistic logic to
substantive doctrines such as 'liberty of contract."' 312 Their critique
was court centered, and it attacked the Langdellian vision of legal
science; they lamented the "petrification" of the judicial process and
the "mechanical" method of reasoning employed by judges.313 This
307. Id. at 4, 29 (quoting Deuteronomy 1:17 (King James)) (footnote omitted).
308. Botein, supra note 241, at 64 (quoting President Taft).
309. CARUTHERS EWING, THE SPIRIT OF THE TIMES 8 (1912); see generally Botein, supra
note 241, at 55.
310. HOUGHTON, supra note 206, at 159.
311. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
312. WHITE, supra note 297, at 360.
313. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606, 607 (1908)
[hereinafter MechanicalJurisprudence].Pound qualified his position on "mechanical" judging in
a later series of articles, Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pt. 1), 36 HARV. L.
REV. 641 (1923); (pt. 2), 36 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1923); (pt. 3), 36 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1923)
[hereinafter Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision] (maintaining that mechanical reasoning
was appropriate in such fields of law as property and commercial transactions).
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prevailing "jurisprudence of conceptions," they argued, sacrificed
justice in the name of technicality (or "Spencer's Social Statics") and
stood in the way of "social progress. 3 14 Recalling the "great
achievements of the youth of our case-law," Roscoe Pound concluded
that "[o]ur judge-made law is losing its vitality."3'15 What was needed

was a "sociological" jurisprudence adjusted to "human conditions,"
3 16
with logic relegated to its "true position as an instrument.

Sociological jurists expressed nostalgia for the days of Kent and
Mansfield, but they looked to enlightened legislators and lawyers
rather than judges as the primary agents of legal reform. Living under
the "new dispensation" of Holmes, judges were expected to legislate

and statute,
"interstitially," within the bounds of custom, precedent,
317
guided by the "social sense" of utility and justice.
The emergence of sociological jurisprudence is commonly
regarded by historians as a critical turning point in American legal
history, signaling the moment when judges were first acknowledged
as lawmakers rather than law-finders.3 18 Yet, as has been shown

above, judicial lawmaking was a recognized feature of the nineteenthcentury legal landscape. Indeed, the legislative nature of common law
judging had been a source of "perennial conflict" from the time of the
Revolution. 319 The legitimacy of judicial lawmaking and the
underlying distinction between legal and political reasoning were
contested periodically in the nineteenth century. Attempts were made
to cabin judicial discretion and increase the public accountability of

judges through such mechanisms as elections and codification. Legal
314. MechanicalJurisprudence,supra note 313, at 610.
315. Id. at 615.
316. Id. at 609-10.
317. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially...."). For scholars and judges adopting this approach, see, e.g., Joseph C.
Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 274, 276-77 (1929). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The
Holmesian Judge in Theory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19 (1995).
318. See WHITE, supra note 11, at 252 (linking the demise of the oracular theory of judging
to the rise of "sociological jurisprudence"); see also G. Edward White, From Sociological
Jurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America,
58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1000-14 (1972); cf. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 49, 53 (1995) (crediting Holmes with initially broaching the theme of the judge
as "an occasional creator of law" but viewing John Chipman Gray as the first to make this
theme "explicit," even as he subscribed to an "Austinian-cum-Langdellian view of the judicial
role").
319. See TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 13, at 118-19; see also Gordon S. Wood,
Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 49, 58 (problems of judicial
discretion and judicial lawmaking long recognized and "deeply rooted in our history").

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:151

professionals aiming to defend the common law system against such
incursions first tended to describe the judge as an impartial craftsman.
However by mid-century they were increasingly inclined to attribute
creative powers to the judge, recognizing him as an author of the law.
Thus, in speaking of the judge as a "legislator," sociological jurists
were not presenting a radically new vision of adjudication. The
sociological jurists of the early twentieth century were, in many
respects, simply responding to a renewed attack on the common law
system, in the form of the judicial recall movement. And the judicial
ideal they presented in their writings was something of a synthesis of
nineteenth-century versions of the ideal-now reconstituted in the
form of the creative craftsman.
A. The Creativity of the Craftsman
Due to the critical orientation of most sociological jurists, their
writings generally offer more in the way of negative impressions
rather than idealized images of the judge. For instance, Roscoe
Pound's influential article, Mechanical Jurisprudence, is full of
examples of both ancient Roman and modern American judges
imprisoned by precedent, endeavoring to make rules to fit casesregardless of common sense or convenience.32 0 To the extent that
Pound does offer a positive description of the judicial role, he speaks
in relatively vague and modest terms:
[T]he task of a judge is to make a principle living, not by deducing
from it rules, to be . .. 'immortal for a great many years,' but by
achieving thoroughly the less ambitious but more useful labor of
giving a fresh illustration of the intelligent application of the
principle
to a concrete cause, producing a workable and a just
321
result.
The fullest portrait of the sociological jurists' ideal may be found in
Benjamin Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921)-a
judicial autobiography of sorts.
"In moments of introspection," reflected Cardozo, "the
troublesome problem will recur, and press for a solution. What is it
that I do when I decide a case?" 3 22 The Nature of the JudicialProcess
was Cardozo's extended answer to this question. Adopting a
confessional tone, he admitted that the "strange compound which is

320. See MechanicalJurisprudence,supra note 313, at 607, 614-21.
321. Id. at 622.
322. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-10 (1921).
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brewed daily in the caldron of the courts" was a product of judicial
choice rather than "submission to the decree of Fate."3 23 Although he
and his colleagues on the bench endeavored to take an objective view
of the cases at bar, he acknowledged that "we can never see them
with any eyes except our own. 3 24 Judges, like other mortals, were
susceptible to subconscious influences; prejudices, predilections,
instincts, emotions, habits, and convictions made the man, "whether
he be litigant or judge." 3 2 In his early years on the bench, Cardozo
had anxiously sought the "solid land of fixed and settled rules, the
paradise of a justice that would declare itself by tokens plainer and
more commanding than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own
vacillating mind and conscience. 3 26 But certainty was not the repose
of the more mature judge: "I have grown to see that the process in its
highest reaches is not discovery, but creation." He concluded that all
of the "doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the
travail of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in which
principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are
3 27
born."
Though creation was an inevitable aspect of the judicial process,
Cardozo emphasized a number of "jural principles" serving to guide
the judge in the common run of cases, thereby ensuring both the
stability and social utility of the law.3 28 As he deliberated, the judge
was to make use of four primary methods of analysis: philosophy,
history, custom, and sociology. "We go forward with our logic.., till
we reach a certain point," Cardozo explained.3 29 Where logic could
not decide the case, "[h]istory or custom or social utility or some
compelling sentiment of justice or sometimes perhaps a semi-intuitive
apprehension of the pervading spirit of our law, must come to the
rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him where to go."330 Thus
Cardozo's model judge was no "knight-errant, roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness," nor would he yield
'33 1
to "spasmodic sentiment" or "vague and unregulated benevolence.
Rather, his discretionary acts were "informed by tradition, method323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 10, 11.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 166, 167.
See id. at 129-30.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 141.
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ized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the
primordial necessity of order in the social life.""'33 While it was
impossible for the judge to completely "transcend the limitations of
the ego," Cardozo maintained that he should strive as far as humanly
possible to "objectify in law" the aspirations and convictions of his
contemporaries.3 33 For the personal and general mind were, on his
account, "inseparably united"; though the judge's perception of
"objective right" took the color of his subjective mind, his mind was
334
itself conditioned by "customary practices and objectified beliefs."
Despite his appreciation of the partiality of all human judgment,
Cardozo remained confident of "the inescapable relation between the
truth without us and the truth within. '335 With proper training in the
"art" of decision making, and perhaps also "the aid of that inward
grace which comes now and again to the elect of any calling," the
judge could emancipate himself from his personal prejudices and rule
from the perspective of the "man of normal intellect and
336
conscience.'
Such faith in the existence of a common good and the
correspondence between an individual and a collective mind
dissipated by the second decade of the century. The outbreak of
world war as well as the inequities and hardships engendered by
industrialization contributed to a general atmosphere of skepticism
about the "core values" of American culture. 337 Traditional symbols
of virtue and respectability were increasingly subject to attack and
former models of success became "figures of irony and pathos. ' 38
One such casualty was the ideal of the romantic judge, who could
transcend his own personal predilections with a single bound of
thought, approximating social justice as near as was humanly possible
through his rulings. For as modern juristic thought turned inward
upon itself, a mote "realistic" conception of the judge's role emerged.
Operating from an explicitly interdisciplinary perspective, a new
generation of legal academics insisted that the private motives and
values of the judge, rather than the existence of rules or constitutions,
332. Id. (quoting 2 FRANQOIS GENY, MtTHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT
PRIVE POSITIF 213 (1919)).
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 106, 173.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 163, 89.
See WHITE, supra note 11, at 152. See generally HENRY FARNHAM MAY, THE END OF
AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF OUR OWN TIME, 1912-1917 (1959).
338. WHITE, supra note 11, at 152.
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provided "the key to understanding the law."33 9 Judicial behavior was

analyzed in psychological terms, and judicial decisions were read as
the outcome of a judge's "entire life-history." 34° The truth of the
matter, Jerome Frank confirmed, was that "'we can never get outside

ourselves .... We are shut in our own personality as if in a perpetual
prison." ' 341 The judge was no more likely to escape from this cell of
consciousness than any other mortal man.
B. Creativity and Self-Restraint
With the rise of Legal Realism, one might have expected a
decline in the tendency to celebrate the "Great Judge." Indeed, Frank
suggested that the "artificial, orthodox tradition of 'the ideal judge"'
was antithetical to the Realist enterprise, which was premised upon

the idea that judges were "fallible human beings. ' 342 Of course, Frank
was speaking in exaggerated tones; as has been shown above,
propagators of this "tradition" generally did not deny the fallibility or
humanity of the judge. In any event, a survey of the legal literature of
339. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 89 (1973). For
other works addressing the historical significance of Legal Realism, see, e.g., DUXBURY, supra
note 318, at 65-159; N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR
AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 19271960 (1986); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
(1973); William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the
JudicialInterpretationof the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW-1791 AND 1991, at 266, 268-286 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud
Haakonssen eds., 1991); and John William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465,
468-502 (1988).
340. FRANK, supra note 2, at 124. Frank's Law and the Modern Mind was part of a general
expansion of literature on legal psychology in the early decades of this century, reflecting the
influence of behaviorism, Freudianism, and abnormal psychology. For a sample of such works,
see, e.g., EDWARD STEVENS ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935); Hutcheson, supra
note 317, at 274-288; Harold D. Lasswell, Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking, 40 INT'L J.
ETHICS 354 (1930); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (pt. 2), 14 A.B.A. J. 159, 159-61
(1928); Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, supra note 313; Max Radin, The Theory of the
Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 357-62 (1925); Theodore Schroeder,
The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CAL. L. REV. 89, 89 (1918) (applying modern
analytic psychology to the study of opinions in recognition of the fact that "[h]uman motives
and mental mechanisms are not altered when one assumes the judicial function"); Donald
Slesinger & E. Marion Pilpel, Legal Psychology: A Bibliography and a Suggestion, 26 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 677, 682 (1929); Karl Georg Wurzel, Methods of Juridical Thinking, in SCIENCE OF
LEGAL METHOD 286 (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B. Register trans., 1917); and Hessel E.
Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 480 (1928). See
generally PURCELL, supra note 339, at 87. For an illuminating exploration of the theological and
romantic roots of psychoanalytic theory, see SUZANNE R. KIRSCHNER, THE RELIGIOUS AND
ROMANTIC ORIGINS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: INDIVIDUATION AND INTEGRATION IN POSTFREUDIAN THEORY (1996).
341. FRANK, supra note 2, at 124 (quoting Anatole France).
342. Id. at 156.
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the twenties and thirties indicates that legal professionals-many of
whom were associated with Legal Realism -continued to articulate
judicial ideals through the medium of the biography. What is
particularly striking about this literature is the extent to which
discussions about the ideal judge centered around Oliver Wendell
Holmes, even when another judge was the formal subject of the piece.
For example, Holmes was the standard against which Cardozo's work
was assessed in Felix Frankfurter's essay: there was only "one judge
of greater originality and deeper penetration into the intellectual
presuppositions of the judicial process" than Cardozo-the "Master,"
Mr. Justice Holmes.343 Holmes was also the central focus of a number
of pieces appearing in legal periodicals as well as mainstream
publications such as The New Republic.344 It would seem that Holmes
had become a symbol in American legal culture, and, true to his own
prediction, what was symbolized by his image depended upon the
mind who saw it. To John Dewey, Holmes stood for the "liberal mind
in operation"; 345 to Pound, for the emergence of a functional point of
view in the realm of adjudication; 346 to Frankfurter, for a
constitutional philosophy that struck a balance between state sovereignty and federal control, while remaining responsive to the needs of
a "complex industrial civilization"; 347 and to Llewellyn, for the
survival of human virtue in a "dollar-ridden," "machine-made age. ' 34s
But underlying all of these admiring portraits of Holmes (and those
like him) was a common sense of the ideal judge-a more skeptical
version of the creative craftsman. That is, there was a decided
emphasis upon judicial restraint as a virtue, a new appreciation of the
aesthetics of judging, and an admiration for the judge who could
fearlessly face life in "this great and awful Universe, where man is so
little and fate so relentless. '349

343. FELIX FRANKFURTER, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, in LAW AND POLITICS:
OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-1938, at 88, 88-89 (Archibald MacLeish &
E.F. Prichard, Jr., eds., 1939) [hereinafter LAW AND POLITICS].
344. See WHITE, supra note 297, at 363-66.
345. John Dewey, Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 33, 35
(Felix Frankfurter ed., 1931).
346. See Roscoe Pound, Judge Holmes' Contributions to the Science of Law, 34 HARv. L.
REV. 449, 450 (1921).
347. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution:A Review of His TwentyFive Years on the Supreme Court, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 345, at 46, 86.
348. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 512,
513 (1962).
349. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 345, at 126,
135.
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Biographers in this period were less likely to distinguish the
judicial from the legislative role; they spoke of judicial lawmaking
with a new candor and applauded the "statesmanship" of individual
judges. Nevertheless, the judges they idealized exercised a chastened
creativity as they legislated from the bench. For instance, Frankfurter
placed Justice Louis Brandeis "in the tradition of Marshall" insofar as
he recognized that the Constitution was not a "literary composition"
but "a way of ordering society, adequate for imaginative statesmanship."350 Yet while Marshall "could draw with large and bold strokes
the boundaries of state and national power," Brandeis was faced with
the less sweeping task of applying "settled, general doctrines" to
concrete cases.351 Moreover, the skeptical judge was no social
engineer, immersed in contemporary affairs; "[s]ociological
problems" did not preoccupy his mind and the "market place was not
his milieu. 352 Rather he studied the processes of government and
industry from a distance, "walked humbly" in the domain of
economic affairs, and deferred to legislative resolutions of social
conflicts.353 In a complex, dynamic society, the skeptical judge
proceeded in a cautious spirit, mindful of the fact that "the last
' 354
acquisition of civilized man is forbearance in judgment.
Whereas men like Marshall and Kent laid the foundations of
American law, the skeptical judge left a more modest mark behindthe particular style of his judicial opinions. Though "rules are
compelling and cases come down in dull monotony," Walton
Hamilton maintained, "the manner of the judge appears in the
interstices of opinion. ' 35 Biographers called attention to the literary
quality of law reports, reminding readers that the work of the judge
was "in essence the composition of human rivalries. ' 35 6 Law was
350. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS
47, 53 (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1932). As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 35561, the judge's opinions might still be admired from an aesthetic point of view. For instance,
Frankfurter introduces a passage from a Brandeis dissent on utility regulation with the following
apology: "To detach part from a closely knit exposition in which each step is buttressed by proof
is to mutilate. But even a torso conveys intimations of an artistic whole." Frankfurter, supra, at
76.
351. Frankfurter, supra note 350, at 96.
352. FRANKFURTER, supra note 343, at 92.
353. Id. at 96.
354. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note
345, at 119, 123.
355. Walton H. Hamilton, The Jurist'sArt, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, supra note 350, at
169, 173.
356. FELIx FRANKFURTER, When Judge Cardozo Writes, in LAW AND POLITICS, supra note
343, at 103, 103 (emphasis added).
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indeed one of the "mansions in the house of literature," insisted
Frankfurter.3 5 7 The opinions of Cardozo (read by the bar "for
pleasure") demonstrated that "law is stunted and undernourished by
life, if it falls below the dignity of literature. 3 58 And those of Holmes
deserved a place in "any adequate anthology of English prose."35 9 But
even more praiseworthy than the judge who could tell the "story of
the law" with imagination and charm, was the one who deployed
rhetorical devices to produce persuasive opinions. Brandeis's skillful
use of legal forms and conventions allowed him to "escape from the
3 6°
recent holdings predicated on 'freedom of contract' as 'the rule."'
Yet his opinion was admired less as a triumph of social justice than as
a feat of legal legerdemain: "It is all done with such legal
verisimilitude ... [and] attended with so little of a fanfare of judicial
trumpets .... [An argument which degrades 'freedom of contract' to
a constitutional doctrine of the second magnitude is compressed into
a single compelling paragraph."3 61 The judge's art could be
appreciated for its own sake.
That was what the creative judge had come to by 1930: he was a
self-conscious manipulator of legal devices to uncertain ends. His
journey of "self-discovery" had led him to an unsettling conclusion:
while his judgments had the look of law, they were essentially and
necessarily self-revelations.3 62 A lesser man might have resigned his
post upon such a realization, but the skeptical judge seemed almost to
revel in the absurdity of his position. For he saw that, at bottom, the
predicament of the judge was the human predicament: "Man's
upward course from the first amoeba which felt a conscious thrill, is
no more than the effort to affirm the meanings of his own strange self,
to divine his significance and to make it manifest in the little hour
'
The skeptical judge appeared to be a "puny"
vouchsafed him."363
figure bravely striving to endure "in the midst of the appalling
tragedy of existence. 364 While the common lot of men shrunk from
the very freedom they claimed to champion, fearful of confronting
357. Id. at 104.
358. Id. at 106.
359. Id. at 105. In particular, Frankfurter averred, Holmes' "dissenting opinion in the
Abrams case will live as long as English prose has power to thrill." Frankfurter, supra note 347,
at 72.
360. Hamilton, supra note 355, at 172.
361. Id. at 173.
362. See FRANK, supra note 2, at 114.
363. Hand, supra note 349, at 130-31.
364. Id. at 130.
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the inanity of their lives, the skeptical judge stoically accepted his true
calling as the creator of his world. He knew that there was no value
outside of himself, that what he desired was the measure of right and
wrong, that he was the ultimate judge. In his "keen" eyes, "openedwide,"'365 one could see that he had a fighting faith in nothing,
absolutely.
C. Doing God's Work
Jerome Frank titled a 1931 article with a question: Are Judges
Human? The answer was implied in the asking, and the article
continued his effort to cure lawyers and the laity of their need for a
"Father-Authority" with a healthy dose of legal realism.3 66 Yet, upon
reflection, it would appear that the Realists actually came far closer
than their predecessors to deifying the judge. To appreciate this
feature of the Realist portraits, it is helpful to consult Jack Miles'
God: A Biography, which provides a delineation of what it is that
makes the God of the Bible "godlike." According to Miles, the
distinguishing feature of God's character is that it is wholly
prospective: "He has no history, no genealogy, no past that in the
usual way of literature might be progressively introduced into his
story to explain his behavior. 3 67 The literary character of God is
defined in and through his creative acts; he has no identity distinct
from or prior to his appearance in the opening scenes of the Book of
Genesis as the creator of the world. He has no discernible subjective
life or private desires and can only pursue an interest in himself
through mankind.3 68 God can only be known-to himself and
mankind-through his creative work. In a similar fashion, the Realists
portrayed the judge's life and his work as coextensive and mutually
defining. They knew him only as "Mr. Justice"; all of his thoughts and
actions were judicial in orientation and import. And his greatness was
unaccountable to history:
It is indubitably inscribed in authentic documents that [Holmes]
was born in 1841, and, being a legalistic person myself both by
nature and practice, I must accept this for some purposes. But ...
[s]ecretly I believe that he has spent his time travelling about with
inordinate velocity; at least I know that his head at any rate has
365. Id. at 133, 134.
366. See Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931); see also FRANK,
supra note 2, at 243.
367. JACK MILES, GOD: A BIOGRAPHY 87 (1995).

368. See id. at 88.
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often been in the stars, and I suppose the rest of him must have
gone along. You know that if you can move fast enough, you will
keep time back in some curious way that baffles the clocks. At any
rate, while we have been working along at3 69 mere terrestrial
velocities, he has certainly not been growing old.
Ultimately, the most godlike portrait of the judge was to come from
the most unrelenting Legal Realist: Jerome Frank. His rendering of
"Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Completely Adult Jurist"
in the final chapter of Law and the Modern Mind also serves as a
fitting conclusion to this historical analysis of the judge in American
legal literature.
"One wise leader pointing the way we have had with us many
years," began Frank. 3 0 "The judicial opinions and other writings of
Mr. Justice Holmes-practitioner, teacher, historian, philosopher,
judge-are a treasury of adult counsels, of balanced judgments as to
37 Frank offered some
the relation of law to other social relations.""
choice selections from this treasury, and added a counsel of his own:
"Holmes's adult illusionless surveys are an indispensable aid and an
inspiration. ' 3 Thus Holmes ascended to the throne of the "great
'37 3
judge." And this was apparently accomplished "without armies.
For as Frank insisted toward the end of this chapter (the italics are
his): "The great value of Holmes as a leader is that his leadership
implicates no effort to enslave his followers. 37 4 Historians have cast

doubt on the extent to which Frank and other Progressive and Realist
lawyers were truly following Holmes's lead, showing that they
effectively converted Holmes to their own purposes. 375 To be sure,
Frank's portrait does bear a striking resemblance to its author. And
one cannot help but read Frank's tribute to Holmes as an unconscious
expression of his own yearning for a "Father-Judge." Yet perhaps the
most ironic aspect of the "Completely Adult Jurist" was his ability to
assume the very objective, omniscient perspective Frank derided
throughout Law and the Modern Mind. Frank's Holmes could
penetrate the false surfaces of the legal system, clearly perceiving the
way the law really worked. And he recognized that his "essential
attitudes towards the universe" were simply the product of "early
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Hand, supra note 349, at 136.
FRANK, supra note 2, at 270.
Id.
Id.
Holmes, supra note 296, at 208.
FRANK, supra note 2, at 276.
See WHITE, supra note 297, at 362-69.
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associations and temperament, coupled with the desire to have an
absolute guide. 37 6 How he acquired this "adult emotional status,"
however, is left to our imagination. Nowhere in his portrait of this
jurist did Frank discuss Holmes's ancestry or his childhood. Nor did
he reflect upon his subject's formative professional experiences. And
there was certainly not even a whisper about Lady Clare Castleton.3 77
This last omission may simply be attributed to some lingering
Victorian prudery. But the exclusion of all biographical detail is
striking.37 The Justice thus appears as a disembodied intellect-the
ultimate self-made man. In following his lead, Frank is not only
showing us that growing up is hard to do. He is demonstrating-albeit
unwittingly-that the pursuit of law involves no small measure of selfcontradiction.
CONCLUSION

In Law and the Modern Mind, Frank brought to light what he
saw as "peculiarly the modern sin": personification of the rule of law
' The first step towards salvation,
in the image of the "Father-Judge."379
he admonished his colleagues, lay in recognizing law as the creation
of fallible human beings. In presenting his ideas as revelations about
the judicial process, however, Frank left a distorted impression of the
legal tradition inherited by his generation. The truth of the matter is
that judicial lawmaking was no news to the American legal profession
in 1930. Indeed, when placed in historical perspective, Frank's
exposure of the "creative judiciary" appears more like an indelicate
breach of professional etiquette than a revolutionary insight into the
true nature of law. For as this article has shown, the creativity of the
judge was increasingly recognized and celebrated in the nineteenth
century, reflecting the extent to which romanticism penetrated the
legal culture and altered notions of the judicial mind. It was not the
mechanical jurisprude but the judicial genius who embodied the
professional ideal in the so-called "Age of Formalism." Thus, when

376. FRANK, supra note 2, at 276.
377. For an account of Holmes's relationship with Lady Clare Castleton (an Irish aristocrat
with whom Holmes became acquainted in 1896), see TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 13, at
142 n.* (maintaining that Holmes was "smitten by the lady" and suggesting that she may have
emboldened him to take the "intellectual leap" represented by The Path of Law).
378. Frank seems to have taken Holmes at his word when he insisted "'Since 1865 there
hasn't been any biographical detail."' SILAS BENT, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES ix
(1932) (quoting Holmes).
379. FRANK, supra note 2, at 19.

CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:151

Frank proclaimed that "the law is made by and for men, 3 80 he was
essentially restating the romantic view of adjudication.
All the same, there was something rather significant lost in the
transition from the romantic to the realist perspective on judicial
lawmaking. That something was a romantic conception of
consciousness, which affirmed the human capacity for selftranscendence. The romantic judge was capable of combining his
subjective understanding of the world with an objective view of that
same world. His opinions were impartial without being impersonal.
They were creative expressions, bearing his unique imprint, but they
nonetheless constituted authoritative legal norms; he was the
recognized author of these opinions, yet as he delivered them, he
stood for the rule of law. This romantic figure, however, was not the
judicial lawmaker Frank and other Realists placed at the center of
their studies of adjudication. They began from the premise that a
judge's vision, like that of any other ordinary human being, was
circumscribed by the fact that he could never get outside of himself.
The "creativity" of the judge was reconceived as an expression of this
constraint, rather than proof of a "divine presence." With this altered
perspective on the human mind, Realists propagated a new judicial
ideal-that of the skeptical judge, who was acutely aware of his
confinement within the cell of his own consciousness. The skeptical
judge appreciated the autobiographical quality of all judicial opinions
(including his own), and recognized them as rationalizations of the
author's own biases and motives. The self-awareness and "intelligent
doubt" he displayed, however, seemed at times to shade into selfcontradiction. We are left to wonder how the skeptical judge came to
know of these limitations on human cognition, without stepping
outside of himself. As he offered his "illusionless" surveys of the law,
he was effectively assuming an omniscient perspective, even though
he had been denied the capacity to do so by his biographers. In
portraying the judge in this fashion, the Realists thus betrayed a
lingering romanticism. And they followed the tradition of their
fathers in another important sense: they continued to envision law's
rule in the form of a judge.
Tracing the progression of judicial ideals through the history of
American law from 1800 to 1930, we are led to a paradoxical
conclusion. In a polity said to be ruled by laws, not men, there was a
growing tendency to personify the "rule of law" in the image of the
380. Id. at 269.

1998]

LA W AND THE CREATIVE MIND

judge. Indeed, the "anthropomorphizing of the Law" which Frank
deplored (even as he committed this "modern sin" in his rendering of
Holmes) continues to the present day. The identification of a judicial
opinion as the work of an individual author does not necessarily
undermine its authority as a matter of law. Indeed, the opinions of
certain great judges-such as John Marshall or Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.-are regarded as especially persuasive legal authorities.
Moreover, the integrity of the judicial system is widely thought to
depend on the preservation of the "personalized judicial role"; judges
are expected to be personally involved in the decision-making
process, through listening to oral arguments, reading legal briefs, and
crafting reasoned opinions which bear their signatures.3 81 However,

judicial opinions are not simply treated as the personal views of
judges. And the legal authority of a judicial opinion does not derive

from the personality of its author. Although the American concept of

3 82
the "rule of law" may entail the suppression of judicial subjectivity,

381. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 YALE L.J. 1478, 1483-84
(1983) ("Our task is to manage the courts to preserve the personalized judicial role. The
external accountability of courts depends vitally on judges' personal involvement, including
providing reasoned decisions, identifying the authors of our opinions by name, and listening to
oral argument."); see also Edwards, supra note 8, at 888, 889 (noting that the involvement of law
clerks in the opinion-drafting process does not necessarily undermine the "authoritative nature
of judicial declarations of law," because careful judges will control the creation of each opinion,
each "until the words ... precisely reflect their views on the proper disposition of the case").
Assertions that judges are not, and should not be reduced to, automatons can be found in great
abundance in case law, especially in the context of discussions about the Sentencing Guidelines
and where courts are asked to review the decisions of lower courts or administrative agencies.
See, e.g., United States v. Margiotti, 85 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Sentencing is rigid and
mechanistic enough as it is without the creation of rules that treat district judges as
automatons."); United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 199, 205-06 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Judge Boyle acted
as a judge, drawing upon his life experience and his judicial experiences, making his decision not
simply by working the grid provided by the guidelines, but by balancing the impact of the law
upon an individual human being, given that human being's particularized circumstances, against
the protection of society. He recognized the face behind the law. He declined to function merely
as an automaton."); United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 402 (8th Cir. 1992) (maintaining that
"the Guidelines do not reduce district court judges to mere automatons, passive compilers of
ciphers, or credulous naifs"); United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 412, 418 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Though
we expect a trial judge to be sensitive to the judicial role and to exercise restraint in the face of
admitted provocation, we have no right to anticipate that he will function as some bloodless
automaton."); Allen v. Alabama, 276 So. 2d 583, 586 (Ala. 1973) ("The trial judge is a human
being, not an automaton or a robot. He is not required to be a Great Stone Face which shows no
reaction to anything that happens in his courtroom.... We have not, and hopefully never will
reach the stage ... at which a stone-cold computer is draped in a black robe, set up behind the
bench, and plugged in to begin service as Circuit Judge."). The essential role of human emotions
in adjudication has also been emphasized by legal scholars. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum,
Emotion in the Language of Judging,70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 23, 30 (1996); Samuel H. Pillsbury,
Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of CriminalPunishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655,
655-56 (1989); Benjamin Zipursky, Deshaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1101, 1146 (1990).
382. See KAHN, supra note 55, at 103-33.
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it seems also to require an exponent in the form of a human judge.
The fact that we continue to entrust this finite figure with a task of
such magnitude suggests that he cannot simply be viewed as a
romantic survival. He expresses what is perhaps a more fundamental
and unyielding human impulse to see beyond ourselves.

